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Introduction
Abstract
While current scholarship often points to a direct link between the ideology of Young
Turks and the Kemalists, a closer analysis indicates there are many breaks in this
link. This thesis analyzes the main influences on the Young Turk movement and the
emergence and rise to power of the Kemalist movement, highlighting points of
difference in the two movements’ ideologies and practices. Although the Young Turk
movement influenced the Kemalist movement in the early years of the Turkish
Republic, this thesis seeks to highlight the differences and discontinuities that
existed between them. While many ideas from the Young Turk movement did carry
over to the Kemalist movement, the extent and form of some of ideas differed.
Scholars acknowledge that the Young Turk movement included numerous factions,
whose ideology and practices differed greatly. Noticeable divides existed within the
Young Turk movement, particularly between the movement’s leadership and its
radical faction, the garbcilar. It is the ideology of the Young Turk leadership’s inner
circle, the Central Committee, which is often compared with that of the Kemalists.
However, many of the notable individuals who went on to lead and contribute to the
ideology of the Kemalist movement were actually associated with the garbcilar and
did not play a role in the Central Committee. In support of this argument, I will point
to how the garbcilar, rather than the CUP central leadership, provided much of the
inspiration for the radical aspects of Kemalist ideology and policies that prevailed in
the early twentieth century.
To be clear, this thesis does not seek to discredit or disprove current scholarship, but
rather to present the relationship between the ideology of the Young Turk and
Kemalist movements through a different lens. By tracing the ideological links of the
Kemalists back to the Young Turk movement, this thesis will highlight the limits of
ideological continuity. In doing so, it will contribute to the existing scholarly literature
on Ottoman and early Turkish thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
Chapter Outline
Chapter One: The Late Ottoman Empire
This thesis begins with a background on the late Ottoman Empire and the conditions
that contributed to the growth of Ottoman opposition and identity formation in the late
nineteenth century. Chapter One explores the factors that influenced the ideological
currents of the Young Turk movement and the historical emergence of nationalist
trends during the late Ottoman Empire. Chapter One then goes on to discuss the
emergence of Ottoman opposition groups, particularly the development of the Young
Turk movement, and the 1908 Young Turk Revolution.
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Chapter Two: The Young Turk Era
Following the 1908 Revolution, the Young Turk movement faced many challenges.
This chapter begins by detailing some of these challenges and explaining the larger
impact they had on the direction and ideology of the movement. Additionally, this
chapter dissects the Young Turk movement by discussing its membership base,
leadership and organizational structure. This chapter concludes with a discussion on
the trending currents of ideological thought within the Young Turk movement and the
main factors that influenced these trends.
Chapter Three: Kemalists
Chapter Three begins with an explanation of the fall of the CUP leadership and the
rise of the Kemalist leadership. This chapter details the rise of Turkish nationalist
movement during the late years of the Ottoman Empire and how the Kemalists, led
by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, came to lead the Republic of Turkey. Additionally, this
chapter outlines the demographic and ideological shifts that took place during the
early years of the Turkish Republic and how the Kemalists enacted a series of rapid,
ruthless reforms meant to capitalize on these changes.
Chapter Four: In Comparison
This thesis concludes with an analysis of additional examples of discontinuity in the
ideology and practices of the Young Turk and Kemalist movements. This chapter
includes comparisons on each movement’s stance on the following topics:
embracing Western civilization; violence and forced assimilation; national identity;
education and language; and secularism. Examples in this chapter seek to highlight
the commonalities between the ideology of the garbcilar and the Kemalists.
Literature Review
There is no lack of scholarship on the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the
Turkish Republic. The works of Erik Zürcher and M. Şükrü Hanioğlu alone provide
ample information for a comparison between the Young Turk and Kemalist
movements, as the two scholars have spent the much of their academic careers
focusing on this topic. The works of other prominent scholars, such as Kemal Karpat,
Selim Deringil, Uriel Heyd, Jacob Landau and Fatma Muge Göçek also provide
unique insight on the changes and challenges of the late Ottoman Empire and early
Turkish Republic. Göçek in particular does a wonderful job detailing the complicated
interactions between the various ethnic and religious populations of the Ottoman
Empire. Karpat’s work on the ideological shifts and factors that influenced Ottoman
intellectual circles is also essential to the analysis of Young Turk and Kemalist
thought.
Prominent authors in the Ottoman-Turkish history field (such as Zürcher, Hanioğlu
and Mardin) all discuss Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s place within the Young Turk
movement and the influences of the Young Turk era on the Kemalist movement. This
thesis does not seek to disprove these authors, but to reexamine where the
Kemalists fit into the structure and ideology of the Young Turk movement by

4

approaching this subject from a different angle. By doing this, this thesis will more
accurately trace the ideology of the Kemalists within the Young Turk movement.
Current scholarship, especially from the above-mentioned authors, sufficiently shows
the ideological links between the Young Turk and Kemalist movements. However,
while available research focuses on the continuity between the two movements, it
does not draw enough attention to many aspects of early Kemalist ideology and
practices that originated from the Young Turk movement’s radical faction and
differed from its core leadership. In drawing a line between the ideologies of each
movement, this thesis will show that current scholarship often minimizes the precise
origins of Kemalist ideas.
When discussing the Young Turk movement’s ideology, practices, and evolution,
most scholars acknowledge that the movement consists of various factions and
groups, but still tend to refer to the Young Turks as one cohesive body. However,
there were notable differences between the movement’s central leadership, its
radical factions, and its lower-ranking membership. While some authors differentiate
between these groups and factions, this practice is not consistent across current
scholarship. There is not consistent usage of terms like “Unionists”, “Liberals,”
“Young Turks” and “CUP members.” This evidences the difficulty in separating these
terms and identifying the boundaries between them. Zürcher and Hanioğlu, however,
do give adequate attention to differentiations in terminology and both authors lay out
how they use different terms in their writings.
In addition to a review of secondary sources, this thesis reviews the writings of
members of the Young Turk and Kemalist movements, such as Ziya Gökalp,
Mustafa Kemal, Abdullah Cevdet, Yusuf Akçura, and Ahmed Rıza. While these
sources are essential to a discussion on ideological currents during this time period,
they often show bias and present inaccurate information. This is particularly true of
Mustafa Kemal’s Nutuk, in which Kemal outlines a completely fictional narrative of
the history of the Turkish Republic. These primary sources must therefore be
carefully analyzed and biases must be noted. Despite such inaccuracies, these
primary sources highlight the developments in the individuals’ thoughts and ideas
throughout their lives.
Methodology
In addition to an extensive selection of secondary sources, this thesis focuses on an
analysis of periodicals, journals (İctihad, Türk Yurdu, Türk), articles, speeches
(Nutuk, Grand National Assembly, Turkish Republic anniversaries), and memoirs
(Gökalp, Cevdet, Akçura, Kemal and others).
Many materials analyzed for this thesis came from the private libraries of Boğaziçi
University, Bilkent University, and Koç University as well as the public libraries of İBB
Atatürk Kitaplığı (Atatürk Library), Milli Kütüphane Başkanlığı (National Library), Türk
Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Society), and TBMM Kütüphanesi (Library of
Parliament).
Primary source material used for this thesis was primarily in modern Turkish or
Ottoman Turkish. Because of the language barrier with some sources, this thesis
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also draws on primary source material cited in selected secondary sources. Many
sources had translations available in English; those sources not available in English I
either translated myself or enlisted the assistance of colleagues.
Scope
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are arguably the most turbulent, conflicted,
and complex in the entire history of Ottoman Empire. It is impossible for this thesis to
cover all the factors that influenced the emergence and evolution of the Young Turk
and Kemalist movements and their respective ideologies. However, this thesis seeks
to highlight the major factors influencing these movements and points to outside
sources where the reader can find additional information on selected topics.

Chapter 1: The Late Ottoman Empire
The late nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire was a time of evolving ideas and
practices, many of which focused on how to preserve the deeply troubled state. The
Ottoman Empire faced economic, political and territorial challenges that many
Ottoman officials believed could only be solved through a series of reforms. The
then ruling Hamidian regime took steps it believed would help the Empire catch up to
Europe and ensure its longevity in the face of domestic threats. In doing so, the
regime consolidated its power, which in turn led to many factors that fueled the
emergence of opposition to the ruling regime.

A Century of Change
Implementation of the Tanzimat
In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman central government began implementing a
series of reforms aimed at advancing the Empire’s military, economy, and
technology. The abolition of the Jannisaries in 1826 marked this new age of Ottoman
reform led by Sultan Mahmud II called the Tanzimat. Ottoman military reforms in the
eighteenth century, including the attempt by Selim III to create a modern army, had
not produced the desired results of halting the Empire’s decline, and Ottoman
leadership realized the urgency of taking additional steps to preserve the state.1
In comparison to Western countries, Ottoman rulers believed the Empire was less
advanced, particularly in these areas noted above. Ottoman rulers envied the
perceived superiority of the West and sought to imitate its developments. The
Ottomans also faced the domestic threat of increasingly autonomous minority
communities who sought to break away from the Empire. In an attempt to close this
gap with the West and secure the state, Ottoman Sultans—Mahmud II, Abdülmecid,
Abdülaziz, and Abdulhamid II—implemented a series of reforms, which they believed
would help repair the Empire.
Issued in 1839 by Mahmud II’s successor Abdülmecid, the Gülhane Edict was one of
the most important reforms of the Tanzimat era. The Edict promised security and
1

Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 253-254.
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equal rights to all the Empire’s subjects, regardless of their religious beliefs. 2 In
1856, Abuülmecid expanded upon the rights granted by the Gülhane Edict with the
Imperial Reform Edict. 3 The 1856 Edict received mixed reactions from Ottoman
subjects and had a limited reach. As Karpat explains,
The [1856] rescript declared equality in military service (which nobody liked), justice, schools
(already Christian schools were far more advanced), abolished the head tax, and provided
equality of employment in government, though the implementation of all these measures was
very limited.4

Karpat adds that as an unintended consequence, granting ‘equality’ to Ottoman
subjects increased the economic power of the Empire’s non-Muslim groups and
indirectly contributed to their respective nationalist struggles.5
The Tanzimat accelerated the centralization of the Empire that was already
underway by bringing an end to the Empire’s millets. On a domestic level,
centralization policies aimed to counter the threat of community leaders and
rebellious elements.6 With the abolishment of the millets, the Ottoman state began
handling the legal matters and taxation of the non-Muslim communities. This
signaled the Ottoman central government’s attempt to exercise more control over all
its subjects.
Many of the policies enacted during the Tanzimat era pushed a state-molded idea of
Ottoman citizenry to the Empire’s subject. These included the adoption of an
Ottoman national anthem, Ottoman national flag and, for the first time, an official
definition of Ottoman citizenship. This official definition of citizenship, outlined in the
Nationality Law of 1869, did not reference religion.7 However, as Hanley notes, the
development of this official definition of Ottoman affiliation focused primarily on
acquisition and loss of nationality (rather than the rights and obligations that
nationality conveyed).8
The Empire’s modernization efforts prior to 1839 focused primarily on reforming the
military, but the Tanzimat marked a change in the Empire’s strategy. At this point the
Ottoman leadership began incorporating new social, administrative, and legal
policies throughout the Empire.9 The Empire’s bureaucratic elite, intelligentsia and
ulema felt a new social base was necessary for the Empire’s survival. Ottoman rulers
also began to realize that they could not simply claim legitimacy and that they must
redefine Ottoman citizenry. Through the enactment of Ottoman citizenry-related
policies of the Tanzimat, the Ottoman state hoped to secure its grasp on the
Empire’s subjects. These policies exemplified efforts by the Ottoman state to mold its
subjects into loyal citizens.
Emergence of Ottomanism
Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.” p. 778.
“Edict of Reforms (Islâhat Fermani) (1856).”
4 Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 259.
5 Ibid. p. 259.
6 Ibid. p. 253-259.
7 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.” p. 778.
8 Hanley, “What Ottoman Nationality Was and Was Not.” p. 277.
9 Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System.” p. 69-88.
2
3
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With the implementation of the Tanzimat came the emergence of a state-endorsed
identity, Ottomanism. The state’s promotion of Ottomanism was an attempt to unite
the Empire’s many ethnic and religious groups, ensure allegiance from its subjects,
and subdue any ‘nationalist and separatist enthusiasms’.10 Ottomanism centered on
the creation of a shared identity for Ottoman citizens and its supporters believed it
would turn the Empire’s population into citizens of the state. The Tanzimat marked
the Empire’s first official shift towards the creation and promotion of a unified
Ottoman identity. Part of this shift was the new use of the term ‘Ottoman’. Prior to the
Tanzimat era, ‘Ottoman’ described the Empire’s ruling circle and elites. During the
Tanzimat era, the Ottoman government began using the term ‘Ottoman’ to describe
all the Empire’s subjects in an attempt to eliminate the distinctions between the
rulers and ruled.11
Under the banner of Ottomanism, the state allowed non-Muslim communities to
maintain their individual languages, customs, and religions so long as they were
loyal to the Empire. The state hoped to use Ottomanism to create a “separate but
equal” environment that allowed the state to exercise more control of non-Muslim
communities. 12 However, the state encountered barriers to creating this new
environment.
Despite its attempt to create a cohesive identity among the Empire’s inhabitants, the
state’s reforms led to amplified divisions along religious and ethnic lines. Ottomanism
became a failed attempt by the state to create a common political identity that
superseded faith, ethnicity and language. The dissolution of the millet system, in
particular, led to a number of unintended consequences. 13 However, even though
the government did not achieve its intended goal with Ottomanism the concept still
had a deep impact on the formation of identities within the Empire. Instead of
creating unity among the Empire’s citizens, Ottomanism instead increased
awareness of the religious, ethnic and linguistic divides in Ottoman society.
The government attempted to use Ottomanism to bypass the existing ethnic and
religious loyalties of the Empire’s non-Muslim groups. Karpat argues that this
strategy did not produce the desired effects since it lacked an emotional appeal.
Instead, it appealed to Muslim intellectuals who “seized upon Ottomanism as a
nationalist ideology of their own and defined its content according to their own
cultural-social background and interpretation of history.”14
As the Empire’s religious ratio continued to shift in favor of the Muslim population,
the concept of a multinational Ottoman state based on shared citizenship no longer
held the same value for the state. In line with this development, the Ottoman state
shifted its focus to solidifying the unity of its dominant population as a strategy to
ensure its survival. In line with this strategy, Abdülhamid II put heavy emphasis on

Fuad Pasha, one of the Empire’s more notable elites at this time. Quoted in Davison, “Turkish
Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth-Century.” p. 852.
11 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 140.
12 Ibid. p. 140-141.
13 Ceylan, “The Millet System in the Ottoman Empire.” p. 259-261.
14 Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 261.
10

8

the Empire’s Islamic qualities in an attempt to gather loyalty and support from Muslim
subjects.15
Dissolution of Millet System
In the pre-Tanzimat era, religious pluralism was a key characteristic of Ottoman
society. Under the millet system, religious communities lived separately yet still
interacted and cooperated with one another.16 Braude describes the millets “not as
an institution or even a group of institutions, but rather a set of arrangements, largely
local, with considerable variation over time.” 17 These ‘arrangements’ between the
Ottoman central government and non-Muslim communities allowed the millets to
exercise a certain degree of autonomy and contributed to the continuation of
individual languages, traditions, customs, and religious practices.18
The Empire’s non-Muslim Ottoman subjects organized themselves into three distinct
millets: Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews. Under this millet arrangement these
communities lived alongside the Muslim communities and had recognition, but not
equality. This differentiation allowed the non-Muslim communities to preserve their
diversity and identities. 19 Ottoman policies of tolerance towards non-Muslim
communities through the millet concept created an environment where a degree of
coexistence was a practical and political possibility. This space of coexistence
allowed the various religious and ethnic communities of the Empire to “recognize and
adapt to the inevitability of difference.”20 In a conversation on this topic, Baer and
Makdisi say the state’s tolerant policies were a strategy the Ottomans employed to
manage the Empire’s religious and ethnic groups. As part of this strategy, the central
government allowed non-Muslims a degree of autonomy but not full equality, thereby
controlling the extent to which non-Muslim subjects could manifest their difference.
The Ottoman state therefore tolerated these groups while simultaneously
discriminating against them.21
The primary concern of Ottoman officials in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries was
to maintain the status quo, that is, the superiority of Muslims over non-Muslims.
While the millet system had once allowed the Ottoman state to ensure this status
quo, the gradual rise in status of non-Muslim communities meant the state was
losing its control over the Empire’s social hierarchy. The Ottoman Muslims, who had
long held the top positions, faced a new environment where non-Muslim

Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire.” p. 12.
The meaning of the term millet changed throughout the late centuries of the Ottoman Empire. In the
pre-Tanzimat era, Ottomans used the term when referencing the legal systems of the Empire’s nonMuslim communities. Over time, the term came to symbolize “nation.” Braude, “Foundation Myths of
the Millet System.” p. 65-86.
17 He also argues that the millets were a myth, since there was no official administration of nonMuslims until the nineteenth century. Ibid. p. 83.
18 Davison, “The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire.” p. 319329.
19 Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System.” p. 69-70.
20 Baer cautions against using the word coexistence to describe inter-relations as it suggests equality
between groups. In the Empire certain groups were legally subordinated to others. Baer, Makdisi, and
Shryock, "Tolerance and Conversion in the Ottoman Empire: A Conversation." p. 929.
21 Ibid. p. 930.
15
16
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communities dominated many sections of the Empire’s economy such as trade,
industry, and finance. 22
Davison argues Ottoman non-Muslim millets played a decisive role in the
introduction of Western-style reforms to Empire by acting as vehicles of change. In
particular, Davison points to the non-Muslim millets’ contact with European powers,
their role in importing the printing press to the Empire, and the number of Western
missionary schools established in their communities.23 These factors helped the nonMuslim millets noticeably improve their levels of wealth and education, gaining a
superior status to the Muslim majority. As these millets became increasingly
independent, the Empire sought to redefine how its inhabitants interacted with each
other. As a way to restrict the growing power and influence of the millets, the
Ottoman government moved to dissolve the system by eliminating the distinctions
between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.24
Sectarian Violence
While the millet system organized the Empire’s religious communities on the basis of
inequality, these communities had a certain level of independence. For example,
since each religious community conducted its own administration, each also had its
own legal system. The abolishment of the millet concept also meant the abolishment
of each religious community’s legal system.25 The government’s decision to bestow
equality on the Empire’s inhabitants was therefore not a welcome change. The
Tanzimat reorganized the millets so it was no longer religion that determined one’s
place in the Ottoman hierarchy. This caused problems on both sides. The nonMuslim millets felt content with their previous social and economic status and now
the Muslim millets became angered by their new, equal status with individuals over
whom they had long had superiority. Among its unintended consequences, the
disintegration of the millet system directly contributed to the rise of sectarian conflicts
within the Empire.26
In the nineteenth century the Empire’s economic and social environment shifted in
favor of the non-Muslim communities. Karpat argues that centralization policies,
more than any other measures initiated during the early nineteenth century, were
instrumental in shifting the balance of Ottoman social, economic, and political
relations. 27 This new environment prompted a shift in the interactions of Muslims
and non-Muslims and in the view of the Ottoman state towards non-Muslim
communities. While the Muslims once held a prestigious economic position in the
Empire, they began to doubt their superiority over non-Muslims and believe the nonMuslims communities had certain advantages. Muslims began to feel threatened by
not only the loss of the Empire, but also the loss of their superior status within the
Empire.28
22

Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 7.
Davison, “The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire.” p. 319337.
24 Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876. p. 388.
25 Ceylan, “The Millet System in the Ottoman Empire.” p. 259-263.
26 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 130-134.
27 Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908.” p. 251-256.
28 Ibid. p. 245-246.
23
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Exposure to Western and Russian trade in the late eighteenth century, along with
territorial losses, led to the downfall of one of the Empire’s biggest economic bases,
the Black Sea. This downward economic trend continued into the following century,
pushing the Ottoman state to the brink of collapse. Karpat points out that the
consequences of this deteriorating economic situation did not affect all subjects of
the Empire at the same time or with the same intensity. 29 Under these economic
conditions a new middle class arose consisting predominately of non-Muslims. The
socio-economic advancement of non-Muslims forced Muslims out of their positions
of superiority and prestige. As this non-Muslim middle class expanded, the Muslim
middle class continued to shrink. This forced Muslim middle-class subjects into less
important jobs and weakened their role in the Ottoman economy.30
Rising fears in the Muslim community stemming from this trend led to violent
outbursts by Muslims against Christians and Jews during the nineteenth century in
places such as Aleppo, Mosul, Nablus, Jeddah, Egypt, Lebanon and Baghdad. This
sectarian violence signaled a larger communal rupture taking place in Ottoman
society. 31 It also enhanced European perceptions of Muslim intolerance towards
non-Muslims and led to deteriorating sectarian tensions.32
Muslims began associating Christians with the social, economic, and cultural
changes taking place in the Empire. An increase in the economic status of the
Christian community became apparent with the construction of new homes and
churches. Muslim beliefs that the Christians were overtaking their role as the
Empire’s dominant group spurred feelings of anger and fear. Muslims saw advances
in the Christian community as setbacks for their own community. Christians also
shared their faith with European powers, which led to their frequent identification with
the West in the minds of many Muslims. According to Masters, Christians also began
to display a growing political assertiveness, which further contributed to Muslim fears
that Christians were overtaking them in the social, political, and economic hierarchy
of the Empire. Christian links to the West enhanced their political confidence as they
received increased support from European officials and missionaries. Masters
argues that it was this increase in political confidence, rather than the wealth or faith
of the Christians, which led to a growth in social distance between the Empire’s
Muslim and Christian communities.33
The Missionary Threat
During the Tanzimat period, Western powers increasingly intervened on behalf of the
non-Muslim populations of the Empire. These interventions not only created
difficulties in carrying out many of the Tanzimat era reforms but also had a lasting
impression on many of Ottoman subjects, particularly those who were already
disillusioned with the state of the Empire.

29

Ibid. p. 244-246.
Ibid. p. 250.
31 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 130.
32 Ibid. p. 134.
33 Ibid. p. 194.
30
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Western intervention came in many forms, one of which was the widespread
presence of missionaries in the Empire. Missionary work began in late 1820s and
gradually became a systematic, large-scale activity throughout the nineteenth
century. 34 Missionary activity gained momentum in the 1880s and 1890s and
reached its peak during that time.35 Missionary activities in the Empire concentrated
mostly on non-Protestant Christian subjects, among them the Greeks and
Armenians.36 Through missionary activities Europeans had an indirect, unanticipated
impact on the politicization of religious identities in the Ottoman Empire. Competition
among the European powers for influence via missionary activities also impacted
religious identities.37
As missionary activity gained momentum during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II
the relationship between the Empire and the missionaries became one of “mutual
suspicion and dislike.” Abdülhamid II himself referred to missionaries in the Empire
as “the most dangerous enemies to the social order.”38 As Deringil describes, the
Ottoman state linked the threat of missionaries directly to the survival of the state:
“None of the challenges to the legitimacy of the Ottoman state, and all it stood for, was more
dangerous in the long term than that posed by missionary activity. The threat posed by the
solider, the diplomat, the merchant, all had to do with the here and now; the missionaries
through their schools, constituted a danger for the future.” 39

The Ottomans believed the missionaries undermined efforts to legitimize the basis of
their rule.40 Ottoman opposition to missionary activities focused particularly on the
influence of missionary-run schools and the printing press. 41 However, the
missionary problem was only one of many threats to Ottoman efforts legitimize their
rule and safeguard the Empire. Missionaries had protections from colonial powers,
introduced modern medicine, brought with them the printing press, and established a
wide network of schools and churches. The missionaries’ possession of scientific
knowledge and Western technology also distinguished them from Ottoman
subjects.42 Missionaries portrayed themselves as representatives of modernity and
superior culture. 43 In this way missionaries extended the reach of European cultural
and political influences.
Ottoman Education and Intelligentsia

Erhan, “Ottoman Official Attitudes Towards American Missionaries.” p. 317.
Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman
Empire, 1876-1909. p. 114.
36 Erhan, “Ottoman Official Attitudes Towards American Missionaries.” p. 319.
37 Masters, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism. p. 152.
38 Salt, “A Precarious Symbiosis: Ottoman Christians and the Foreign Missionaries in the Nineteenth
Century.” p. 56
39 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman
Empire, 1876-1909. p. 112.
40 Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire.” p. 12-13.
41 Erhan, “Ottoman Official Attitudes Towards American Missionaries.” p. 320.
42 Makdisi, “Reclaiming the Land of the Bible: Missionaries, Secularism and Evangelical Modernity.” p.
680-682.
43 Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman
Empire, 1876-1909. p. 132-134.
34
35
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The influx of missionaries to the Ottoman Empire also stimulated the growth of
religious and educational activities in many non-Muslim communities. The Ottomans
understood that the only way to effectively compete with the high-quality education of
the missionaries was to provide viable alternatives of equal quality. 44 However,
foreign schools in many Ottoman provinces preceded the establishment of Ottoman
schools and therefore set the standard for quality of education in the area. This belief
that education could help the Empire overcome its missionary threat helped fuel the
expansion of the Ottoman education system, which was already underway. The
Ottoman education system sought to rival that of European missionaries,
neighboring states, and non-Muslim minorities. This expansion of the Ottoman
education became a defensive weapon against the emerging threats to the integrity
of the Empire.45
In areas not heavily populated by missionaries, Ottomans worried about schools built
by neighboring, nationalist-minded states and non-Muslim minorities.46 A rise in the
level of non-Muslims’ education had not gone unnoticed by Muslims or the Ottoman
central government. By the nineteenth century Ottoman authorities had come to
believe non-Muslim minority-run schools were superior to state-run schools.47 This
accelerated the state’s establishment and expansion of Ottoman schools.
Not only the quality but also the quantity of non-state schools state worried the
Ottomans. European powers built more schools than the Ottoman government, and
they built them faster. They also had more money to fund these schools.48 Already
by 1894 there were 4,547 minority-run schools and 413 foreign-run schools in the
Ottoman Empire.49 This had a dramatic impact on the number of Ottoman Muslims
versus non-Muslims receiving their education in these schools, which led to a steady
increase in the attendance of Ottoman minority students throughout the nineteenth
century.
Improved and expanded education was a conscious, deliberate response to the
threat that Ottoman territories faced. The central government believed the Empire
was increasingly susceptible to instability tied to the presence of missionaries,
activities of Ottoman minority groups, and the influence of outside powers. In its
attempt to counter these perceived threats the state produced an entirely new
version of education, one that fused Islamic values and Western methods. A shift
towards this version of education occurred under the leadership of the Hamidian
regime. During that time the state used a more selective approach of adapting
Western models and institutions. An underlying Ottoman belief that the secret of the
West’s success could be adapted to Ottoman circumstances guided this shift. Fortna
refers to this as an “Ottomanized version of Western-style education.”50 Instead of
only adopting the Western methods as they were, the Ottoman state blended
44
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Western and Ottoman traditions to create an education system that fit its needs.
Fortna argues that this style of education contributed to a shift in the way Ottomans
perceived themselves, their place in the world, and their relationship with the state
and its various communities. 51
The expansion of the education system did not lead to the emergence of an Ottoman
intelligentsia, but it did accelerate its development. The establishment of Westernstyled schools was instrumental in the advancement of Ottoman intellectual thought.
However, changes to the Ottoman social and economic landscape had wider
reaching effects on the Ottoman mindset. As the Ottoman education system
expanded and improved throughout the nineteenth century, the resulting changes
mostly affected larger Ottoman towns and cities. However, the new class of
intelligentsia that arose during the Hamidian period came from Ottoman provincial
towns. Unlike the Young Ottoman intelligentsia before them, members of the
Hamidian-era intelligentsia often belonged to the lower-ranking strata of the
population as opposed to the middle and upper levels of Ottoman bureaucracy.
According to Karpat, this indicates that the rise in Hamidian-era intelligentsia
stemmed more from the increased social and economic status of provincial Ottoman
towns.52
Ottoman intelligentsia not only expanded under the reign of Abdülhamid II, but also
developed into a politically significant group. The establishment of professional
schools helped create conditions that filtered the rising group of intelligentsia and
contributed to their development into a group of political elites. New avenues of
communication also helped accelerate the rise of Ottoman intelligentsia and played a
decisive role in fostering ideological discussions. This began in the mid-nineteenth
century with the introduction of the postal system, telegraph, railways, and modern
press. The establishment of the press, in particular, had a drastic impact on the
emergence, spread and development of ideas, as it allowed information to reach
larger numbers of people in the Empire.53
Defining ‘Turk’
Ergul’s review of Ottoman documents indicates that the term ‘Turk’ was well known
among Ottoman subjects but that there was no clear definition for the term. There
was therefore much ambiguity about who was a ‘Turk’.54 The majority of Ottomans
did not self-identify as Turks despite recognizing the Turkish nature of the Ottoman
ruling class and language.55 However, non-Muslim community leaders did call the
Ottoman bureaucracy “Turkish” and believed that the Ottoman state was already a
Turkish state.56
Through the mid-nineteenth century the Empire’s bureaucrats identified themselves
as ‘Ottomans’ or ‘Muslims’, not ‘Turks’, a term which they used to differentiate
between ethnic groups or as a derogatory reference to peasants or nomads in
51
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Anatolia.57 The inhabitants of Anatolia, often referred to as ‘Turkmen’, were thought
by most Ottomans to be ‘boorish’ and ‘rough’. The term ‘Turk’ referenced these
characteristics. This negative connotation of the term ‘Turk’ prevailed among the
Ottoman elites and particularly in larger cities, such as Istanbul.58 Lewis notes that,
“To apply it to an Ottoman gentleman of Constantinopolis would have been an
insult.”59
In the span of one century the meaning of ‘Turk’ changed drastically. Makdisi
summarizes this change below:
…from the old regime meaning of an imperial elite that disparaged the common “Turk,” to a
secular Tanzimat legal citizenship and official discourse of patriotic Osmanlilik that included
all Ottoman subjects, to a more ambiguous, more romantic, more exclusivist late Ottoman
meaning that ennobled the “Turk.60

Kusher attributes this shift in meaning to a number of ‘inspirational factors’. Firstly,
the members of the ethnic-Turkish educated class had close contact with nationalism
through education and personal contacts with other Turkic peoples from outside the
Empire. They also had accessibility to an abundance of literature being published on
the Turks, Turkish language, and Turkish history during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. The emergence of Turcology studies and the expansion of
available scholarly works on the field also contributed to a shift in terminology.
Changing political and social circumstances in the Empire, coupled with these
‘inspirational factors’ helped formulate new opinions on what it meant to be a
‘Turk’.61
The Western world’s use of the term ‘Turk’ and its perceptions of the Ottoman state
changed as well. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe there existed
multiple, diverse, and inconsistent ideas of ‘Turks’ formed in part by travellers’
experiences in the Ottoman Empire. By the eighteenth century these perceptions
shifted to focus on scholarly writings of European authors who presented a coherent,
consistent, and often negative view of the Turks.62 Ergin notes that negative images
of Turks and the Ottoman Empire became so entrenched over time that, “Westerners
in the first half of the twentieth century who questioned these images upon closer
contact with Turkey presented their change in opinion as a radical conversion.” 63
These negative perceptions of the Turks led in part to the Ottomans becoming
increasingly preoccupied with their public image, particularly in the nineteenth
century. This contributed to the rise of what Deringil describes as “Ottoman image
management,” which he says was one of many efforts to simultaneously defend and
unite the Empire.64 Ottoman uneasiness over the Empire’s public image stemmed in
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part from concerns over missionary activity in the Empire. The Ottomans believed
that the missionaries fueled anti-Ottoman sentiments in the Western press by using
phrases like “Terrible Turk.”65 Negative references, such as “unspeakable Turk” or
“sick man of the East,” prompted Ottoman statesmen to actively project a positive
image abroad. Ottomans saw this task as essential to the Empire’s survival and
legitimacy.66

Emergence of Ottoman Opposition
Hamidian Era
The gradual disintegration of the Ottoman state coincided with a rising need for a
new solution Empire’s challenges. Centralizing reforms, beginning with Selim III,
began as an attempt by the Ottoman state to salvage itself and later as an attempt to
control the Empire’s subjects and status quo. Abdülhamid II maintained the dominant
trends of the Tanzimat, particularly centralization, but also shifted towards a more
“Islamic-styled official nationalism.” A drive for Muslim unity was one of the distinctive
characteristics of the Hamidian period. Abdülhamid II emphasized Muslim unity by
capitalizing on pre-existing trends and pan-Islamic sentiments. 67 This shift began
after the Empire’s loss of the Balkan Christian provinces during the Russian-Ottoman
War of 1877-1878.68
Under the leadership of Abdülhamid II a small circle of handpicked individuals
exploited power. Political participation remained limited to close associates and
supporters of the Sultan and his inner circle. In an attempt to further consolidate his
power Abdülhamid II suspended the Ottoman constitution in 1878, which sought to
place a check on his powers. He had approved the constitution in 1876, just two
years before. Afterwards, some Ottomans intellectuals began expressing their
opposition to Abdülhamid II and his policies. In response to the mounting criticism
against him, Abdülhamid II resorted to violent measures to silence his opponents,
often exiling, jailing, and even assassinating them. The regime also engaged in
espionage practices as a way of monitoring and preventing opposition.69
The widespread corruption, oppression and absolutist rule of the Hamidian regime,
along with the continued deterioration of economic, social, and military conditions in
the Empire, directly contributed to the emergence of Ottoman opposition groups in
the late nineteenth century. This began with the Young Ottoman group, which
emerged in 1865 with the goal of saving the Empire from Western encroachment
and internal decay by modernizing Ottoman state and society. 70 Though different in
much of its structure and ideology, the Young Ottoman movement of the Tanzimat
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era laid much of the groundwork for the Young Turk opposition movement that later
appeared.
The Rise of Opposition
The important role Western-styled education played in the rise of Ottoman opposition
sentiments should not be understated. The nineteenth century in particular saw an
increase in the number of these schools in the Empire. Newly established schools
modeled on ones in the West included:
Mektub-i Mulkiye (Civil Service
Academy/School of Administration); Mektub-i Harbiye (War Academy); Bahriye
(Naval Academy); Mektub-i Tibbiyeyi Askeriye (Military Medical Academy); Mektub-i
Baytariyet (Veterinary School); Mektub-i Bahriye (Naval Academy); and Topçu
Muhendishane Mektub-i (Artillery and Engineering School). Many of these schools
had teachers who received some degree of Western-style education and some were
former supporters of the Young Ottoman movement.71
The first members of the Young Turk opposition movement were students attending
the Empire’s Military Medical Academy in Istanbul. These students founded a secret
society in 1889, which they named the Society of Ottoman Union (Ittihad-i Osmani
Cemiyeti). At the time this group only had a few members: Ibrahim Temo, Abdullah
Cevdet, Ishak Sukuti and Cerkez Mehmet Resit.72 The Society’s initial goal centered
on ending Hamidian rule and reinstating the 1876 Ottoman Constitution and
Parliament. In the years following its emergence the Society slowly gained the
support of more students, particularly those in the Empire’s newly established
schools and Western-style military academies. It then opened new branches
throughout the Empire. The Society also established links with Ottoman citizens
living in European countries, such as Ahmed Rıza, a prominent Ottoman intellectual
who later became a leading member of the Young Turk movement in Paris.
As the organization continued to expand it drew increased attention from the Sultan,
leading to the arrest and exile of some of its members by police and the escape of
others to Europe. In the late 1890s the Young Turk movement gained strength in
Europe, and particularly in Paris. During this time opposition within the Empire
remained largely confined to secrecy and subject to oppression from the Sultan. The
Young Turk movement continued to gain strength in the Empire, albeit underground.
Two main factors aided this expansion: word of mouth and the circulation of illegally
distributed journals and papers.73
A common belief that the Ottoman Empire was falling behind and struggling for
survival guided the evolution of the Young Turk movement during the late nineteenth
century. 74 During this time the Young Turk movement developed in two distinct
ways: as an unstructured intellectual movement of opposition to Hamidian rule and
as an umbrella group of individually organized groups and societies. In 1894 the
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Society of Ottoman Union renamed itself as the Ottoman Committee of Union and
Progress (Osmanlı Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti), or the CUP. By the late 1800s the
CUP had become an umbrella organization for the Empire’s opponents of Hamidian
regime. However, the membership of the CUP, while united by the common goal of
ending Hamidian rule and reinstating the constitution, differed on other political and
ideological topics.75
The CUP remained an umbrella organization through the 1908 Young Turk
Revolution. A major part of the CUP’s success in carrying out the 1908 Revolution
was its ability to exist as a larger umbrella organization that acted on behalf of many
smaller groups united by a single goal. However, following the Revolution there was
no longer a single goal that unified the organizations under the CUP’s umbrella.
Many of the groups under the CUP felt they had achieved their goal and no longer
saw a need to continue their activities under the CUP. Others believed that the CUP
should exit the political scene and “leave the business of government to those who
knew the job,” since the majority of the CUP’s members lacked experience in
government positions.76 Accordingly, these groups broke away from the umbrella of
the CUP.
The Young Turks
Is it appropriate to call our committee the “Young Turk Committee”? Surely not…
- Ahmed Rıza 77

The term ‘Young Turk’ first surfaced in Europe as a way to describe the Ottomans
opposed Abdülhamid II’s policies and practices and who worked towards the
restoration of the Ottoman Empire. The term reflected European beliefs that these
individuals were young and predominately Turkish. However, this term was
misleading since many of those involved in the Young Turk movement were not
ethnic Turks. Ironically, among the founding members of the Young Turk movement
mentioned above, none were ethnically Turkish. The movement’s founders actually
had roots in the Russian Caucasus, the Albanian areas in the Western Balkan region
of the Ottoman Empire, and Kurdistan.78 The term ‘Young Turk’ best describes the
military officers that joined the movement in years leading up to the 1908 Revolution.
These individuals were on average 29 years old and of ethnic Turkish descent, fitting
the literal description of ‘Young Turks’.
In the early years of the movement the CUP leadership consisted mostly of
individuals who possessed post-secondary education. The Ottoman intellectuals of
the Young Turk movement saw themselves as members of an elite group, despite
the fact that no official organization of individuals existed. The majority of them
received their education as medical doctors. Even though many of them trained in
military institutions, none of them had actively served in the Ottoman army. 79
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Although some Young Turk members did not identify as ethnically Turkish, they still
proceeded to use the term ‘Turk’ when identifying themselves. They used this term in
a proud, elitist way, as within the Ottoman intellectual circles the term ‘Turk’ had
shifted to indicate positive traits and exclusivity. In newspapers and reviews
published in European countries members of the Young Turks often called
themselves as ‘Turks’ as a reference to their political identity.80 Zürcher also points
out that the Young Turk leadership also used this term when describing themselves,
particularly while living in Europe. 81
Both Hanioğlu and Kayali highlight the challenges of understanding and using the
term ‘Young Turk’:
The vague and inaccurate use of the term Young Turk, especially in the writings of nonTurkish scholars, has created confusion, because many activities have been falsely attributed
to the Young Turks. There were many independent groups working in the Ottoman Empire
against the regime of Abdülhamid II and only some of these had dealings with the Young
Turks.82
An unfortunate misnomer, because it implies that the group of liberal constitutionalists called
the Young Turks consisted exclusively of Turks, of even of Turkish nationalists. The Young
Turks, in fact, included in their many ranks Arabs, Albanians, Jews, and in the early stages of
the movement, Armenians and Greeks.83

Berkes, another prominent scholar on the Ottoman-Turkish transition era, refers to
the ‘Young Turks’ as a mix of “persons, associations, and parties which actually used
other and different names in Turkish, and which represented often opposite views.” 84
In his own writings, Berkes uses the term ‘Young Turks’ to denote those individuals
who opposed the Hamidian regime politically, though he points out that these
individuals often had opposing ideologies despite their unity in Hamidian opposition.
A Young Turk Revolution
In 1896 Abdülhamid II’s secret police uncovered a coup d’état plan, which led to the
exile of many of the Young Turk movement’s earliest members. This resulted in the
remaining Empire-based members of the movement taking their activities further
underground. During this time, the Young Turk movement was far from united and
was divided into numerous factions. Its members only had loose connection and
communication with each other. However, in the years that followed these factions
began to attract more attention from like-minded individuals who also aspired to save
the crumbling Ottoman Empire. As membership began to increase, so did the
communication and organization between the various factions located in the Empire
and elsewhere.
In an effort to unify the various Ottoman opposition groups that had emerged in the
late nineteenth century the First Congress of Ottoman Opposition convened in 1902.
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However, no alliance came about after the First Congress. After the 1902 congress
the Young Turk movement increased its membership, but also the divides among its
membership. As Zürcher notes, these divisions “ran deep and were to play a part in
the politics” between the 1908 revolution and the years leading up to WWI. 85 It was
not until after the Second Congress of Ottoman Opposition in 1907 that the Young
Turks joined forces with other opposition movements to create the CUP. Until this
point the CUP was solely an intellectual movement, spreading their ideas by
distributing pamphlets, newspapers, and journals and holding meetings. However,
once the Europe-based CUP began to join forces with other opposition movements
in the Empire it took on a new, revolutionary momentum.86
This marked a turning point in the pre-1908 Revolution phase of the Young Turk
movement. After this, the integration of the Salonika-based Ottoman Freedom
Society (Osmanli Hurriyet Cemiyeti) brought in many army officers from the Balkan
provinces of the Empire. These members became an important component of the
CUP’s membership, as it was these officers who went on to carry out the
revolution.87
Many members of the Young Turk movement still lived in Europe at the time of the
Revolution. The army officers living in the Empire therefore played the key roles in
the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. At the time of the Revolution the CUP had
approximately 2,000 members, two-thirds of which were military officers. 88 These
military officers carried out a carefully planned Revolution against Abdülhamid II that
resulted in reinstating the Ottoman constitutions and the dismissal of many
individuals from the Hamidian regime.

Chapter 2: The Young Turk Era
Post-Revolution Challenges
After the 1908 Revolution the Young Turk movement faced the challenge of
rebranding itself from a revolutionary movement into a political party. Though many
members attained high levels of education, the majority lacked experience in the
Ottoman administration and had little idea about how to run a government. Among
the movement’s leaders, none had previously held a political position. The
movement also saw many groups under the CUP umbrella organization break away
once the Revolution took place. This led to multiple shifts in the CUP’s organizational
structure, membership base, policies, and ideology.
The Young Turk members took credit for the planning and implementation of the
1908 Revolution, but most members remained relatively unknown within Ottoman
society. Following the 1908 revolution the CUP needed to gain legitimacy in the
eyes of Ottoman citizens. Many of its members were young, unknown army officers
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and low-ranking civilian offers, which added to the challenge of the movement
gaining recognition and legitimacy.89
In many ways the CUP was unprepared for the Ottoman landscape it encountered.
During the years following the 1908 Revolution it carried out reforms in a haphazard
manner and the movement lacked consensus on a coherent ideology, platform, or
direction it should take. Before 1908 the CUP focused its efforts on the Revolution,
not the aftermath. Its members gave comparatively little attention to the political
problems that would need to be solved following the revolution.90
The Young Turks were not the only members of Ottoman society that supported
reinstating the constitution and removing the Empire’s leadership. 91 Other
organizations emerged alongside the CUP, particularly during the years 1908-1911.
Former opponents of the CUP led some of these groups while others emerged as
reactionary groups with differing views. Among these groups were: the National
Unionist Federation (Fedakâran-ı Millet Cemiyeti); the Ottoman Liberal Party
(Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası); the Ottoman Democratic Party (Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası);
the Mohammadin Union (İttihad-ı Muhammedi Fırkası); the Ottoman Committee of
Alliance (Heyet-i Müttefika-i Osmaniye); the Moderate Liberal Party (Mutedil
Hürriyetperveran Fırkası); the Ottoman Fundamental Reform Party (İslahat-ı
Esasiye-i Osmaniye Fırkası); the People’s Party (Ahali Fırkası); the Ottoman
Socialist Party (Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası); and the Association of Mohammedan
Union (İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti). 92 Many of the parties and groups that
opposed the CUP united in 1911 to establish the Party of Freedom and Accord
(Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası), also known as the Liberal Union or Liberal Entente. The
party, whose members were unified by their common opposition to the CUP,
remained politically active for only two years, during which time it was the main
challenger to the CUP. 93

Organization and Structure
The CUP was not monolithic; it was a conglomerate of groups and factions with
different backgrounds, loyalties and leaders. 94 However, as Hanioğlu aptly points
out,
The term faction is insufficient to describe the component groups of the CUP, because they
functioned almost as independent groups and some eventually adopted independent courses,
even severing ties with the center.95

Underneath the formal structure of the CUP there was a system of sub-groups
informal networks. While the CUP’s Central Committee held the decision-making
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power, these factions did not always agree with or follow the decisions of the inner
circle.96
Membership Base
Members of the Young Turk movement were predominantly male, young, urban, and
literate. The movement’s leadership and base membership consisted mostly of
Muslims and ethnic Turks, but also included individuals with other ethnic (Arab,
Albanian, Kurdish) and religious (some Jews, few Christians) backgrounds.97 Most
members of the Young Turk movement came from Macedonia or Constantinople
(Istanbul), while others had roots in the Empire’s Balkan provinces.
Education and profession were the two defining characteristics of Young Turk
membership. Members overwhelmingly received their education and training in one
of the Empire’s new, Western-styled schools established by the Ottoman Sultans.
The majority of the movement’s leadership knew a foreign language, often French.
These French-language skills aided the Young Turk leadership in their studies of
Western social and political thought put forth by European intellectuals, particularly
Gustave Le Bon.98
The Young Turks’ membership also consisted mostly of state employees or
descendants of Ottoman state employees. Among them were teachers in the newly
established schools, lawyers trained in Western law, junior military officers trained in
the Empire’s Western-styled war colleges, journalists, doctors and civil servants. The
CUP had a wide following in the Army and many of its members had military
backgrounds.99
CUP Central Committee
The leadership of the Young Turk movement is well documented amongst the work
of Turkish and Ottoman scholars. Both the civilian and military leadership that
emerged in the post-Young Turk Revolution environment came predominantly (48%)
from the Balkan region of the Empire with the next highest percentage coming from
the capital city of Istanbul (26%).100 The background of the CUP’s leadership played
an increasingly important role in the evolution of the movement’s ideology. Coming
from the Balkan regions of the Empire, many of the movement’s leaders and key
figures witnessed firsthand the expanding gap between Muslim and non-Muslim
communities.
After the Revolution the character of the Young Turk movement changed. Despite
the fact that the military officers carried out the Revolution, it was the civilians of the
CUP that dominated the Young Turk movement’s leadership. However, Talat Pasha
and Enver Pasha, two of the military officers who carried out the 1908 Revolution,
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played increasingly dominant roles in the CUP. As they rose to prominence within
the movement, they pushed aside some of the movement’s founding members, such
as Ahmed Rıza and Abdullah Cevdet, taking away any “real power” that remained
with them.101
Despite becoming a political party in 1909 the CUP remained a mostly secret
organization whose actions were dictated by its Salonika-based Central Committee
(Merkez-i Umumi). Throughout the movement’s existence its true power remained
with the CUP’s Central Committee, which consisted of anywhere from three to twelve
members and was headed by a General Secretary (Katib-i Umumi) who made the
most important decisions. The members of this Central Committee were
overwhelmingly from the Balkan region of the Empire. 102
Since the Central Committee worked behind the scenes, a General Assembly that
consisted of approximately twenty members enacted the organization’s policies. The
CUP also set up a network of provincial centers run by party bosses, which they
referred to in writings as ‘responsible secretaries’, ‘delegates’, and ‘inspectors’. 103
The leadership of the CUP was therefore a very small handful of individuals. The
majority of members in the greater Young Turk movement were not involved in the
CUP’s decision making and policy making or implementation. A divide existed not
only among the members of the Central Committee, but also within the movement’s
broader membership. These divisions highlight the need for current scholarship to
point to specific factions or individuals within the movement when referencing its
influence on the Kemalist movement.

Young Turk Ideology
“The mass basis of the Society [CUP] was amorphous and evolving; this was reflected in the
shapelessness of its ideology.”104

The ideological divisions within the Young Turk movement are most apparent in a
comparison of the ideas of some its notable intellectuals. They include Ziya Gökalp,
Abdullah Cevdet, Celal Nuri, and Yusuf Akçura. These individuals were among the
Ottoman intellectuals who made the most profound contributions to late nineteenth
and early twentieth century ideological discussions. A number of factors, some of
which are detailed below, influenced these individuals’ beliefs and helped shaped the
Ottoman intellectual scene during its final centuries.
Outside Turks
Throughout the nineteenth century there was a noticeable increase in domestic and
cross-border communications between Turkish-speaking people. Familiarity with
Turks from outside the Ottoman Empire expanded as Turkish-speaking immigrants,
many from Russia, came to the Empire. Among the Young Turk movement’s earliest
leaders, many individuals hailed from the Caucasus, Russian Empire or Russian
101
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Transcaucasia provinces. Immigrants from these areas who became active in the
Young Turk movement made important intellectual contributions and helped
influence the movement’s ideology.105 This was particularly true regarding the CUP’s
stance on pan-Turkism.
Pan-Turkism (often used interchangeably with “Turanism” and “Turkism”) originated
among the Tatar peoples in the early nineteenth century and first came to the
Ottoman Empire via Russia emigrants. Supporters of pan-Turkism advocated for the
cultural and political unification of all Turkic peoples and emphasized their common
historical roots. Because pan-Turkism focused on the unification of Turkic peoples
also living outside the Empire, some intellectuals believed it was an unrealistic
strategy.106
Yusuf Akçura, an ethnic Turk from Kazan, was an ardent supporter of pan-Turkism.
Akçura campaigned strongly for pan-Turkism, calling for a unification of all Turkic
people in Asia Minor, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 107 He reiterated this call in his
famous 1904 article “Uç Tarzi-Siyaset” (“Three Ways of Policy”) and throughout his
journal Türk Yurdu (Journal of the Turkish Homeland), which he founded in 1911.108
Some leaders of the Young Turk movement dismissed Akçura’s writings, particularly
his 1904 article, as extremist because he called for an identity based on race (ırk). At
this time Ottomanism still remained popular with some members of the intelligentsia
and promoting an identity based on race would have excluded non-Turkish elements
of the population.
Akçura’s ideas gained some traction within the movement, but mostly clashed with
members of the CUP Central Committee and especially with Ziya Gökalp, who
believed in an identity based on a shared culture instead of race. Even though
Akçura and Gökalp disagreed on aspects of collective identity, Gökalp’s personal
ideology was still very much influenced by Akçura and other ethnic Turks from
Russia, such as Hüzeyinzade Ali and Ahmet Agaoğlu. Their support for pan-Turkish
ideas helped shaped parts of Gökalp’s ideas on Turkish identity.
The CUP had close ties to a number of Turkic associations that promoted pan-Turkic
ideas throughout the Empire. These associations functioned as a way for
intellectuals to put their ideas into action. Among the intellectuals who helped
establish these organizations were Turkic immigrants from Eastern countries and
proponents of pan-Turkism. Akçura, along with other CUP members, established
one of the first associations called Türk Derneği (Association of Turks) in 1911. The
establishment of Türk Yurdu (Turkish Hearth) followed shortly after. By 1914 Türk
Ocağı had sixteen hearths and more than 3,000 members. By 1920, its membership
totaled over 30,000.109 Alongside these association emerged a number of journals
(many of the same name), such as Türk Derneği, Türk Yurdu, and Genç Kalemlar.110
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Ali, set up many of these journals and some of the main contributors were of Central
Asian origin. In the journals, Akçura, Gökalp, and other Ottoman intellectuals
promoted pan-Turkism and the collective awareness of the Turkish people.
These associations and journals were spaces where proponents of mainly panTurkish ideas met for discussions and shared their thoughts. The work of these
associations focused on encouraging the Turkish people to take pride in their culture,
heritage, history and language. By the mid 1910’s pan-Turkism came to be one of
the most dominant ideologies amongst Ottoman intellectuals. For many intellectuals
though, pan-Turkism complimented, not rivaled, Ottomanism. Pan-Turkish ideas
were confined within the overarching identity of Ottomanism and the desire to rescue
the Empire from collapse. However, a distinct shift towards a pan-Turkish identity
and away from a unified Ottoman identity picked up speed after the Balkan Wars as
the Empire’s population dramatically shifted in favor of the Turks.111
Japan as a Model
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many Young Turks paid close
attention to the unfolding events in Japan and Russia. This reinforced their criticism
of European imperialism and aspirations for the Empire to catch up to Europe.
Particularly in the years leading up to the 1908 Revolution, Young Turk publications
often referenced developments in Japan, the tactics used by the Japanese to carry
out the Meiji Restoration, and how these tactics could be applied to the Ottoman
Empire’s own struggle.112 Abdullah Cevdet once referred to Japan’s ability to rival
Europe by saying: “The West slapped Japan only once; it awakened. We have been
slapped a thousand times; if we are still not awake, is it the West’s fault?”113
In the eyes of Cevdet and other Young Turk members, Japan was a model of how
the Ottoman Empire could not only survive, but also become a modern nation
respected by Europe. Both Japan and the Ottoman Empire “sought to westernize
despite Western imperialism at the same time as they both saw themselves as once
part of Asia but no longer of Asia.” 114 The Young Turks’ admiration for Japan
increased in 1902 when Japan signed an alliance with the British, symbolizing to the
Young Turks that the Asian country was considered an equal power. Japan became
the Young Turks’ non-Western model of modernization. Beginning in 1908 some
members of the Young Turk movement, including Ahmed Rıza and Nazim Bey,
started using the term “Japan of the Near East” when describing the Empire. This
term referenced their desire for the Empire to become an “independent, militarily
strong, and economically viable Ottoman polity governed by an elite determined to
realize their Unionist ideology.”115
‘The West’, Westernization and Western Influences
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Frequently referred to by European powers as the “Sick Man of Europe,” the
Ottoman Empire struggled for respect and recognition.116 The Empire continued to
face financial decline and territorial losses, which contributed to European beliefs
that it was incapable of handling its own domestic affairs and increasingly
susceptible to outside influences. European encroachment was not unfamiliar to the
Ottomans. Since Europeans had traded in the Middle East since the Middle Ages,
there was no “dramatic entrance or accompanying culture shock,” instead there was
a gradual increase in European influences that shifted the Ottoman-European
relationship. 117 This progressive European encroachment prompted a shift in
Ottoman politics. Instead of focusing on managing inter-relations and ensuring the
loyalty of the Empire’s subjects, the state increasingly focused on “civilizing subjects
on the world stage of modernity.”118
Makdisi says Ottoman orientalism was a defining characteristic of nineteenth century
Ottoman history. He argues that Ottoman orientalism was not an unintended
consequence of Western influences but instead a defining trait of Ottoman
modernity. In his writings, he defines ‘Ottoman orientalism’ as,
“..a complex of Ottoman attitudes produced by a nineteenth century age of Ottoman reform
that implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the West to be the home of progress and the East,
writ large, to be a present theater of backwardness.”119

Ottomans recognized and responded to the influence of Western powers through a
mix of embrace and resistance. Ottoman modernization was both a quest for power
and an expression of resistance against Western imperialism. 120 Ottoman reform
was part engagement with European influences and part reaction to perceived
European superiority.121
The Young Turks saw an Ottoman Empire that became increasingly penetrated by
and dependent on European powers as Western countries increased their economic
and political influence in the Ottoman Empire. Capitulations had given foreign
residents in the Ottoman Empire exemption from Ottoman taxes, reduced customs
duties, and other privileges.122 The capitulatory system allowed those receiving these
rights to fall under the protection of the countries that granted them, thereby creating
a protégé system that undermined Ottoman rule. To many Ottoman intellectuals the
European capitulations symbolized Ottoman inferiority to Europe and signaled a
broader decline in the Empire’s power and influence.123 They also believed that the
capitulations were a violation of Ottoman sovereignty and a barrier to the Empire’s
progress.
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A belief that the Ottoman Empire was falling behind and struggling for survival
directly influenced the evolution of Young Turk ideology during the late nineteenth
century. Some Ottoman reformers felt compelled to counter ‘European
misrepresentations’ of the Islamic East.124 Ottoman elites also took note of Western
military and technological advances, leading them to compare the Empire to
European countries. Europe became the standard for measuring the progress of
Westernizing reforms. Writings in Young Turk publications, such as Tanin, promoted
the idea that once Westernization reforms were in place, the West would respect the
Empire as an equal power, stop interfering in the Empire’s domestic affairs, and
cease capitulations.125
Intellectual borrowing from Europe contributed to the emergence of ideas and
discussions of a reimagined Ottoman society. A mental transformation took place as
Ottoman intellectuals faced increasing exposure to western life, culture, and thinking
while living in Europe. Westernization became synonymous with modernization and
advancement, and many believed it was the only path to overcoming European
imperialism and countering the Empire’s domestic threats. Members of the Young
Turk movement also believed interactions with the West had a significant impact on
Ottoman thought. One Young Turk leader, Sabahaddin Bey, commented on this
impact by saying, “Since we established relations with western civilization, an
intellectual renaissance has occurred; prior to this relationship our society lacked any
intellectual life.”126
While the Young Turks held Western intellectual thought in high regard, they
criticized the interventionist policies of the West. Eliminating Western economic
penetration and political intervention in the Empire became a driving force behind the
development of Young Turk ideology. As areas of the Empire, primarily the Balkans,
saw more European intervention in economic affairs, it was the Christians and
foreigners under European protections that became the main beneficiaries. By the
end of the nineteenth century the wealth, education, and prosperity gap between
them and the Muslims had grown considerably larger. 127 The members of the Young
Turk movement in the Balkans were increasingly conscious of this divide. The
advancements of the Christian and foreign residents of the Empire also provided the
Young Turks with examples of modernity to which the Young Turks aspired to
achieve. This influenced the Young Turks’ ideas of modernity and their interpretation
of modernity as being synonymous with European ways of life.
The image of Europe and Western societies had a strong and varied impact on
Ottoman thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many Young
Turks received their education in Western-style institutions and lived in European
countries for at least a short period of time. They valued Western civilization while
still opposing Western imperialism; to them the West was both a model and a threat
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to the Empire’s existence. Ottoman intellectuals’ perceptions of the West—its power,
culture, and developments—shaped their ideas on how to reform the Empire.
Civilization
For Ottoman intellectuals the concepts of ‘modernity’, ‘civilization’ and
‘Westernization’ were intertwined. This was increasingly apparent in the nineteenth
century when discussions on Westernizing reforms were on the rise. While the term
‘modernization’ once referred to the goal of overthrowing the Sultan and reinstating
the constitution, its definition later shifted to indicate the implementation of
Westernizing reforms. Modernity became an overarching goal, which was to be
achieved through the adoption of one, or a mix, of the three prevailing ideologies of
the time: Ottomanism, pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism.128
The concept of ‘civilization’ also witnessed considerable transformation beginning in
the eighteenth century. Ottoman intellectuals in the nineteenth century began to use
the term medeniyet to reference the emerging concept of civilization. This term was
influenced by ideas of enlightenment, known as akilcilik (rationalism), and
symbolized the compatibility of science and technology with faith. Nineteenth century
Ottoman intellectuals used medeniyet to signify refinement, grace, order, respect for
set rules, and a higher form of living.129
As Ottoman thought continued to evolve and the concept of civilization gained
popularity among Ottoman elites the concept fused with muasirlasmak (“to reach the
level of contemporary civilization”). By the end of the nineteenth century all Ottoman
elites, regardless of their affiliation as “modernists,” “Islamists,” or “nationalists,” were
in agreement that the Empire must attain the status of being a civilized society.
However, there was no consensus on the degree of civilization the Empire should
adopt.130
Two of the most notable Young Turk members, Cevdet and Gökalp, had different
views on the Empire’s adoption of Western civilization. Early on, Cevdet’s ideas had
a direct influence on Gökalp’s ideological development. Contact between the two
began during Gökalp’s childhood and continued through the foundation of the
Turkish Republic. Cevdet first introduced Gökalp to French thought, particularly
sociology and the works of Durkheim, and urged him to join the CUP in its early
years. Gökalp went on to join the Central Committee and write many of the CUP’s
circulars and memoranda in the decade following the 1908 Revolution.131
While Cevdet and Gökalp had some overlap in their ideas, their beliefs diverged
regarding their stances on the adoption of Western civilization. Gökalp, like other
Central Committee members, cast Cevdet off as ‘radical’ since he promoted the
complete adoption of Western civilization and the exclusion of religion. Cevdet
argued for the complete and total adoption of Western civilization: “There is only one
civilization, and that is European civilization. Therefore, we must borrow western
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civilization with both its roses and thorns.”132 Gökalp instead hoped for a nation that
would “join the civilization of Europe while preserving its own national identity and
culture,” though in his opinion these were separate from civilization.
In his writings Gökalp referenced the similarities between religion and civilization,
saying that Ottoman civilization would emerge from “Eastern spirituality and Western
materialism.”133
Those who accept a civilization with all of its principles cannot take only portions of it. And,
even if they take it, they cannot digest it. Civilization, just like religion, should not be taken
superficially, but internally. Civilization is just like religion. First, it should be believed in and
one should be sincerely loyal to it. 134

By likening civilization to religion, Gökalp emphasized that one could not hold
allegiance to both, thereby underscoring the separation of religion in the adoption of
Western civilization. Gökalp was not always consistent in this belief though. At times
he mentioned the religious foundations of civilization, alluding to the idea that the two
were intertwined: “A civilization first begins as a religious community.”135
Intellectual Influencers
The ideology of the Young Turk movement reflected many of the traditions of the
French Revolution. Many of the movement’s early leaders and members spent time
in Europe, either living in exile or studying, and many of those individuals lived in
France. This was especially true in the years leading up to the 1908 Revolution. The
first faction of the Young Turk movement originated in Europe and spread to many
larger cities, particularly Paris. During this time the scholarly works of French
intellectuals heavily impacted the development of many Young Turk members’
beliefs. Auguste Comte and Gustave Le Bon were amongst the most influential
intellectuals.
Members of the Young Turk movement not only read Le Bon’s works, but also
translated by them into Ottoman Turkish. They regularly cited Le Bon’s ideas on
elitism in Young Turk publications and also in their individual writings. Le Bon’s ideas
penetrated all strands of thought on the Young Turk movement’s ideological
spectrum and were some of the most widely referenced by Young Turk members.
Inspired by Le Bon’s work, the CUP also dedicated part of their efforts to the creation
of an intellectual elite that could guide the masses.
The Young Turks familiarized themselves with popular materialist theories of the
mid-nineteenth century that focused on race. Despite broad support for Le Bon’s
ideas on elitism and populism, the Young Turk movement did not underscore the
importance of race in their formulation of nationalist ideas. The Young Turks’
ideology refrained from creating nationalist aims based on race during the
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movement’s formative, early years. Race was an important part of discussions, but
not of those regarding nationalism, at least not until after the Balkan Wars.
Because of the Turks’ placement in the Darwinist racial hierarchy, and because of
the participation of many non-Turks in the Young Turk movement, the CUP
leadership opted against pursuing a race-based nationalist ideology in its early
years. According to Darwin’s theory, the Turks and Asians were placed at the bottom
of this hierarchy. However, Japanese modernization prompted the Young Turks to
reinterpret their placement in the racial hierarchy. The example of the Japanese
indicated to the Young Turks that their location the hierarchy was inaccurate and that
they could also compete with Western superiority. 136 This altered perception
expanded discussions about the intersection of race and identity within the Young
Turk movement.
Conclusion
Between the Young Turk movement’s ascendance to power and the downfall of the
CUP leadership during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire numerous factors
influenced the movement’s ideology. Throughout this period the Young Turk
leadership pursued a combination of Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism,
depending on the circumstances. No concrete platform for the movement’s ideology
appeared during this time. Instead, the Central Committee attempted to strategically
use multiple concepts to arouse support and obedience from the Ottoman
population. Members outside the movement’s leadership circle, however, did not
always support these concepts. The forthcoming chapters will describe the
divergence within the Young Turk movement’s ideology and this ideology’s link to the
Kemalists movement.

Chapter 3: Kemalists
After the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I, leaders of the Central Committee
credited with Ottoman entry into the war and the Armenian genocide left the Empire
and went into exile. Among them were Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha and Dr. Nazim.
This leadership vacuum led, in part, to the accelerated rise of a Turkish nationalist
movement that was already in the making.137 It was after the exile of CUP leadership
that Mustafa Kemal came to play a leading role in the Turkish nationalist movement.
Kemal’s efforts to strengthen the Turkish nationalist movement were supported by
military officers, activists, and lower-ranking leaders, many of whom had CUP
backgrounds. Among them were Fuat Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir and Ismet Inounu.
The Congresses of Erzurum and Sivas, both held in 1919, were some of the first
decisive steps by the Turkish nationalist movement to advance the goal of creating a
distinctly Turkish nation-state. In Erzurum the members of the Congress named
Mustafa Kemal, a junior military officer and member of the Young Turk movement,
the leader of the national resistance movement. During the Congress in Sivas,
Kemal called on those present to unify around the goal of creating a Turkish
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homeland.138 He also required all attending members to take an oath renouncing the
CUP and its policies. This was one of the first major points of departure between
Kemal and the CUP leadership. From here on out Kemal took every opportunity to
set himself apart from the exiled CUP leadership and their failures.
The Congress in Sivas led to the formation of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli), which
the Ottoman parliament went on to adopt in 1920. Among other things, the National
Pact outlined the need for a National Assembly that would safeguard the interests of
the nation, which did not technically exist yet. After the conclusion of the Congress in
Sivas, Kemal and other members of the movement, including Ali Fuat Ceseboy and
Rauf Orbay, authored the Amasya Circular, the first document setting the national
resistance movement’s plan into motion.139
The Greco-Turkish War, referenced in Turkish historiography as the Turkish War of
Resistance or the Turkish War of Independence, was a military resistance led by the
Turkish nationalist movement against the ethnic Greek inhabitants of Anatolia.
Kemal and the members of the Turkish nationalist movement portrayed the war as
necessary to protect Anatolia, the Turks self-proclaimed homeland. In doing so they
emphasized the importance of Anatolia as a homeland for the Turks and
underscored that the Turks should rise to its defense.140 Kemal also used Islam to
help mobilize the Muslim population to join the war efforts and as a way to create a
sense of unity among those fighting in the war.141
The war lasted from 1919-1922 and ended with the Turkish national movement’s
victory. As a result, Greece released the territory of Eastern Thrace and Western
Anatolia, the two sides agreed to a forced population exchange, and the Treaty of
Lausanne recognized the national sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey. Kemal
became a self-declared hero and the first President of the newly established
Republic. In the first decades of the Republic’s existence, Kemal and his supporters,
known as the Kemalists, enacted a series of sweeping reforms aimed to put the
Republic on the path to modernity. Under Kemal’s authoritarian leadership the
nationalist movement successfully held on to their newfound power, despite multiple
attempts by former CUP Unionists to retake control.142 In doing so Kemal created a
monopoly of power for himself and the members of the Kemalist movement.

Rise of Kemalist Movement
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
Mustafa Kemal’s place in and relationship with the CUP is commonly portrayed in
one of two ways. In his famous 1927 speech, the Nutuk, Kemal described himself as
a member of the CUP whose talents were overlooked by its central leadership.
According to this account, Kemal would later, by his own ambitions, rise to overtake
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Enver and lead the Turkish national resistance that culminated in victory with the
Turkish War of Independence. Turkish historiography largely adopts this view.
Outside of Turkish historiography, however, scholars have more carefully analyzed
Kemal’s relationship with the CUP. Though parts of the above storyline are accurate,
Kemal largely exaggerated or downplayed many aspects of his relationship with the
CUP to further legitimize his leadership role in the nationalist movement and his
separation from the then disgraced CUP leaders. Throughout his ascendance to
power he continued to seek out opportunities to discredit those previously involved
with the CUP and the Young Turk movement. In the Nutuk, and also in his memoirs,
Kemal criticized the old CUP leaders and referred to them as doubters, incompetents
and traitors. All the while Kemal described himself as the original leader of the
Turkish nationalist movement. In his timeline, he disregarded the early years of the
Young Turk movement and reframes the national resistance movement as a struggle
to establish a Turkish state instead of one to save the failing Empire.143
Kemal’s involvement with Ottoman opposition groups began in 1905 when he played
a role in establishing the Fatherland and Freedom society in Damascus and
Salonika. He did not join the CUP until 1908, at which point the organization was well
established and had defined leadership. During World War I Kemal held various
roles of importance, most notably as the commander of the Dardanelles campaign in
1915.144 He was known within the army, mostly for being a ‘trouble maker’ for his
constant criticism of the CUP’s military decisions and his breaches of discipline.
Multiple sources, including Kemal himself, claim that Kemal advocated for the
complete separation of the army from politics and that this led to a tense relationship
with many members of the CUP who did not agree with this stance. However, there
is little evidence supporting this claim.145
Though at one time Kemal regretted his lack of authority within the CUP, the
distance between himself and the Central Committee later worked to his advantage
as Enver Pasha and the other leaders became tied to the Empire’s military defeats
and the Armenian genocide. Kemal pointed to his ‘clean slate’ to help legitimize his
role as commander of the nationalist movement during the Greco-Turkish war. When
he took this role the greater Ottoman public did not know him.146
Building on the success of the war, Kemal later emerged as the unrivaled leader of
the newly declared Republic of Turkey. Both he and his supporters pushed a
narrative that credited Kemal with the existence of the Republic and contributed to
the emergence of a personality cult around him. The Turkish state portrayed Kemal
as the father of the nation and Kemal even adopted the surname Atatürk (“father of
the Turks”) in 1934. The idea that he pulled the Republic from the ashes of the
Empire played a large role in the widespread idolization of him. Turkish schools
taught students not only about Kemalist reforms but also about Kemal’s personal life
and accomplishments. The state erected statues of Kemal in Turkish towns and
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inscribed quotes on buildings and structures throughout the country, many of which
are still in existence today.
Baskan says that the image of a new Turkey and its civilized leader was
“wholeheartedly accepted abroad.” Kemal portrayed himself as an icon of Western
culture and civilization: a well-dressed, well-mannered, well-educated, multi-lingual
individual. 147 He presented himself as the sole creator, and often the sole
implementer, of Kemalist ideology. By pushing this image to the public, Kemal and
his supporters further contributed to the formation of a personality cult around
‘Atatürk’.148 Dogan attributes the formation of the Atatürk personality cult to Kemal’s
ability to establish a direct relationship between the leader and the masses, his
personification as a bearer of collective hope, and his symbol as the future of the
nation.149 Kemal’s image as ‘Atatürk’ helped personify his political power and solidify
his authority as leader of the Turkish Republic. Kemal leveraged his position of
power to cement his role in the creation of the Republic in the minds of the people.
Kemal became a leader with the ability to exercise dictatorial powers. Until his death
he remained at the forefront of the Republic’s leadership, which consisted of
approximately ten other individuals. Throughout his time as president, having a close
personal relationship with him became one of the most important instruments of
power. Unlike the Young Turk movement, which scholars do not attribute to one
individual, this Kemalist movement is in many ways directly tied to Kemal. While
Kemal did not single-handedly implement the radical reforms of the 1920s and 1930s
in Turkey, he is portrayed throughout Turkish historiography and academic works as
the sole figurehead of the movement.150
Kemalists
Despite his role as leader of the state and his ability to dictate decisions to his party,
Kemal did not run the day-to-day operations of the Republic. One of Kemal’s closest
associates, Ismet Inonu, headed seven of the thirteen cabinets and ensured the
implementation of Kemal’s policy decisions.
Similar to the breakdown of the Young Turks, the Kemalists were mostly young,
Muslim males from urban areas. A large majority of them spoke more than one
language, received a Western-style education, and previously served in the Ottoman
military. The biggest shared traits among them were that none received a religious
education at a medrese and none had come from a peasant or working class
background.151
Amongst the fifty most powerful individuals, one-third had Balkan origins and eighty
four percent came from the most developed areas of the former Ottoman Empire.
Additionally, more than half of the leaders of ruling Republican People’s Party (RPP)
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came from the areas of the former Ottoman Empire that were lost in 1911-1913. 152
This had a profound impact on the development of Kemalist nationalist ideology
during the early years of the Republic.
Kemalist Opposition
Early divisions of the Turkish nationalist movement appeared with the establishment
of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara in 1920. Its members held different
views on the functions and leadership of the GNA. Halide Edib, a member of the
nationalist movement, described this divergence as a split between upholders of the
“Eastern ideal” and those of the “Western ideal.”153 During the proceedings of the
GNA another nationalist described it as “a point where two great floods are
meeting.”154 Some believed the GNA should be an institution that lasted only for the
duration of the national movement, while others believed it should follow the path of
the Ottoman parliament or become a permanent institution.
Kemal’s leadership did not go unchallenged. He had the support of only 197 of the
215 members of the first Turkish Parliament. While the members of the GNA united
around the goal of securing Turkish independence and territorial integrity, following
the Turkish victory in the war its membership split into two factions: the First Group,
which consisted of Kemal and his supporters, and the Second Group, made up of
Kemal’s opponents and many former CUP members. 155 The First Group established
the Republic People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası [RPP]) in 1924, which went on
to dominate the second parliament and elect Kemal as the first president of the
Republic. The RPP was the only legal political party in Turkey until 1946.156 The
party began as a conglomerate of local and regional resistance groups. Prior to the
Greco-Turkish War, Kemal sought to unite these groups around the common goal of
establishing a homeland for the Turkish people of Anatolia. These groups formed the
basis of the RPP. The majority of the RPP’s leadership consisted of committed
Turkish nationalists who became involved in the resistance movement early on. In its
early years the RPP operated as an extension to the state and later became its main
tool for indoctrination and mobilization.157
The Second Group represented a very real threat to Kemal and his circle of
supporters. The two groups differed the most on the abolishment of the Sultanate
and Caliphate, an issue that fueled the power struggle between them. In 1924 the
members of the Second Group formed the Progressive Republican Party
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(Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası [TCF]), but its existence was short-lived. In 1925
the Kemalists banned the party and the government returned to a one-party system.
The Kemalists’ decision to ban the party fell in line with their broader goal of
eliminating opposition from former members of the Young Turk movement, which
they sough to disconnect themselves from. The involvement of Rauf Orbay, Kazim
Karabekir, and Ali Fuat Cesboy in the TCF represented a clear, direct link to the
Young Turk movement, which the Kemalists sought to eradicate.158
Kemalists used a one party system to create an environment that was conducive to
Kemal and his immediate circle governing all aspects of the state. To preserve this
environment the Kemalists proceeded to liquidate all existing opposition, beginning
but not ending with the former members of the CUP. The Kemalists sought out and
eliminated these individuals, both literally and figuratively, in the first decade of the
Republic.159 The Angora Trials exemplified Kemalist efforts to discredit and eliminate
any opposition to their authority.
In 1926, a plot to murder Kemal was uncovered in the Turkish city of Izmir after one
of the plotters came forward to the authorities. 160 An investigation was conducted
after which the court accused twenty-nine members of the former CUP of plotting the
murder of Kemal and organizing a coup d'état against the Kemalist regime. Through
a subsequent investigation, the state sought to uncover the post-war activities of the
accused CUP members. 161 In the end the state concluded that a number of
members from the Unionist Party and other opposition groups conspired to form an
organization that would, at the opportune moment, attempt to replace the Kemalist
regime.162 At the end of the trial the court charged the accused with premeditated
murder and planning a coup d'état.163

Kemalism
Kemalism, also known as Atatürkism, was the all-encompassing ideology of Kemal
and his supporters. The Kemalists sought to bring about a civilizational shift in which
a secular, Turkish nation would replace the religious community inherited from the
Ottoman Empire.164 Kemalism evolved over the first decades of the Turkish Republic
but always centered on six intertwined components, also known as the Six Arrows:
republicanism, populism, secularism, nationalism, revolutionism, and étatism/statism.
In 1937 the Turkish parliament officially incorporated these Six Arrows into the
Turkish constitution. 165 These core principles guided Kemalists in their efforts to
transform state, education, law, religion, and social life in the early Turkish Republic.
Kemalists believed these concepts represented the keys to modernity. All six
Kemalist arrows had indisputable roots in the Ottoman era and in many cases
amongst the Westernists, also known as the garbcılar, of the Young Turk movement.
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At the time of the Turkish Republic’s establishment, the question of ‘who was a Turk’
had yet to be answered. In the years that followed, the foundation of the Republic the
Kemalist regime did not offer a clear definition of Turkish nationality. In neither the
Nutuk in 1927 nor in his speech on the tenth anniversary of the Republic in 1933,
Kemal’s two biggest speeches, did Kemal offer up a solid definition of Turkish
national identity. Kemalist era Turkish nationalism was characterized by a conceptual
overlap of race, ethnicity, and nation. However, Turkishness continued to be defined
independently of race and ethnicity until as late as the 1920s.166
Turkish nationalism did not gain immediate and universal acceptance after the
foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Differing views on which direction the
new Republic should take still existed and after 1923 debates continued to take
place on which ideological path to pursue. 167 These differences led to a flexible
understanding of Turkish national identity in the Kemalist Era. The 1930 RPP
program described the Turkish nation as a “social and political formation comprising
citizens linked together by the community of language, culture and ideal.” 168
Elaborating on the Kemalists’ concept of a ‘nation,’ the then RPP party secretary
said:
We consider as ours all those of our citizens who live among us, who belong politically and
socially to the Turkish nation and among whom ideas and feelings such as “Kurdism,”
“Circassianism” and even “Lazism” and “Pomakism” have been implanted. We deem it our
duty to banish, by sincere efforts, those false conceptions, which are the legacy of an
absolutist regime and the product of long-standing historical oppression. The scientific truth of
today does not allow an independent existence for a nation of several hundred thousand, or
even of a million individuals…. We want to state just as sincerely our opinion regarding our
Jewish and Christian compatriots. Our party considers these compatriots as absolutely
Turkish insofar as they belong to our community of language and ideal. 169

Kemalist nationalism was therefore strategically all encompassing in its broad
definition of who qualified as Turkish citizens. This allowed the Kemalists to
continuously mold Turkish nationalism to meet their needs and the present
conditions. Going into 1930s there was a gradual shift towards reframing
Turkishness in terms of ethnicity and race, yet the Kemalists never stopped
attempting to force inhabitants into accepting a Turkish identity through the adoption
of culture and language.
Sculpting Turkish National Identity
Kemal was extremely cautious in the early phase of the Turkish nationalist struggle
when describing the national basis of the movement.170 In the 1930s, the Kemalists
reframed Turkishness by claiming all of Turkey’s past and present inhabitants were
ethnically and racially Turkish. However, in reality this was not the case, as there
were many minorities and non-Turks that resided within the borders of the Empire.
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In an attempt to shift this reality, the Kemalists forcefully pushed Turkish identity onto
the Republic’s population.
The Kemalists did this despite failing to settle on concrete definition of or
requirements for Turkish identity. This included the Kemalists’ use of terms such as
‘Turk’ and ‘Turkish’. While the Kemalists gradually stopped using the terms ‘Ottoman’
and ‘Muslim’, replacing them with ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkish’, there was no clear indication
of what these terms actually meant. 171 Heper notes that Kemal used the term
‘Turkish’ as a name, and not as an adjective. He also used ‘Turkish’ as an umbrella
term that referred to people of different religious and ethnic identities. Thus, the term
had more than one connotation and did not only denote one’s ethnicity. 172 The
Kemalists never provided clear meanings of ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkish’, but they did
differentiate between the two terms in their perceptions of the Republics inhabitants.
In the minds of the Kemalists, one could be born a ‘Turk’, but one must earn the right
of being ‘Turkish’. Being ‘Turkish’ depended on an individual’s acceptance and
acquisition of a set of secular, nationalistic beliefs and rituals.
While the Kemalists put forth a legal framework for Turkish citizenship that included
all the Republic’s subjects, they also made distinctions between ‘citizenship’ and
‘belonging’.173 Thus, non-Turks and non-Muslims could in become Turkish citizens,
but not fully Turkish. Turkishness thus became a category that included some, but
not all, Turkish citizens. 174 The legal framework for Turkish citizenship did not
exclude any communities in the Republic’s borders, however in practice this was not
the case. The state viewed some communities as unwilling to adopt Turkishness and
excluded them in their perceptions of ‘belonging’. Turkishness was therefore a
process that depended on the willingness of the state and the individual. This further
complicated efforts to define the requirements of ‘Turkishness’.175 A discussion in the
Turkish Parliament on the population exchange project during the early years of the
Republic highlighted one Turkish official’s concerns regarding this challenge:
When we want to send the Greeks and Armenians, what will be our answer if they say,
‘These people are Turkish according to the law accepted by your parliament…they cannot be
Turks’. The parliament cannon make these fugitive Greeks and Armenians Turks. They do
not want to be Turks, no way.176

An Environment for Reform
When analyzing how and why the Kemalists were able to implement such radical
reforms in the early years of the Turkish Republic one must understand the unique
circumstances of this time period. First and foremost, the demographic changes that
took place beginning in 1912 were momentous. The loss of the predominately
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Christian Balkans, coupled with Muslim immigration from the Balkans and
resettlement in other parts of the Empire, led to an environment the Kemalist felt was
optimal for rapid reforms. In the early years of the Republic Kemalists gave the most
attention to reforming the overt and visible aspects of Ottoman and Islamic culture,
such as language, appearance, and institutions.177
Kemalist reforms are defined throughout current scholarship as ‘radical’. Dumont
explains that, “the rhythm of innovations was so rapid and so noticeable from the
outside, observers in Turkey and abroad came to believe that the Kemalist
Revolution was by its very nature profoundly different from all past processes of
change in Turkish society.”178 Kemal himself also underscored the pace at which this
transformation took place, referring to the changes as “grandiose movements, more
sublime and intense than what is commonly meant by the word revolution.” 179
Migration was one of the most powerful factors influencing Ottoman identity
transformation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although
migration was not new to the Ottoman Empire, the last years of its existence were
arguably some of most turbulent regarding population shifts. Ottomans constantly
moved throughout the Empire and persons from outside the Empire resettled inside
its fluctuating borders. These population shifts led to noticeable changes in the areas
of the Empire that saw some of the largest influxes of migrants, such as Anatolia.
Years of successive wars, migration and internal violence allowed the Kemalists to
inherit extremely weakened social and religious institutions. Between 1919 and 1927
the population of Anatolia dropped from 15.3 million to 13.6 million. Out of the
population of 13.6 million, a mere 2.6 percent were non-Muslims. 180 This shift
towards religious homogenization provided the Kemalists with an entirely different
population than the one presented to the Young Turks leadership.
The Kemalists saw this new demographic environment as an opportunity to enact a
radical nation-building project. Through a series of rapid, ruthless reforms based on
the Six Arrows, the Kemalists sought to transform individuals living within the borders
of the Republic into their ideal version of loyal Turkish citizens. The state
incorporated cultural, linguistic, and religious elements into the policies it set forth.
Refusal to adopt any or all aspects of Turkish identity was not tolerated, and the
state did not hesitate to crack down on non-ethnic Turkish and non-Muslim groups.
As one British diplomat observed in 1934: “hundreds of persons were arrested for
speaking languages other than Turkish,” especially in Mersin where there were large
populations of non-Turkish speakers.181
Kemalists sought to completely transform society by creating a cognitive revolution in
the Republic.182 Each reform put forth by the Kemalists was an attempt to sever ties
with the Republic’s Ottoman past, to which the Kemalists claimed no links. For
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example, the official day of rest moved from Sunday to Friday, just as in European
societies, and official titles like ‘Pasha’, ‘Bey’ and ‘Efendi’ no longer permitted. 183 The
state also introduced and required the use of the European clock, calendar,
measurement and weight systems, and numerals. 184 An overarching desire to
disconnect from the former Empire was evident in all aspects of Kemalism and also
frequently stated by the Kemalists: “The new Turkey bears no relation to the old
Turkey. The old Ottoman government has passed into history now a new Turkey has
been born.”185
Educational authoritarianism enabled Kemalist leaders to further eliminate links to
the Republic’s Ottoman past and separate religion from the public sphere. 186 The
Kemalists’ belief in education and their depicted roles as teachers of a ‘backwards
population’ were central elements of the new Republic’s guiding ideology. For the
Kemalists, education also went hand in hand with the creation and enforcement of a
shared Turkish identity. Primary education became mandatory for all children,
meaning there was less time for them to attend religious lessons elsewhere.
Kemalists only allowed those seen as ‘dependable’ followers to remain in teaching
positions and promptly dismissed others. This tight control of the state’s education
allowed the Kemalists to seamlessly weave their principles into students’ curricula
throughout their academic careers. 187
The construction of a new education system allowed the state to incorporate its
secular goals through school curricula. To the Kemalists, secularism was not only
the separation of the Turkish state from Islam, but also the separation of Islam from
individuals’ thought and reasoning.188 Religion was therefore not a core component
of Turkishness for the Kemalists. This rejection of religion as part of Turkish identity
directly contrasted with the ideas of Turkishness put forth by Gökalp. Gökalp’s
version of Turkishness underscored the importance of religion as a key element of
Turkish identity. 189 In Gökalp’s mind, religion could act as glue that could help bind
society together under a common identity.
To expand the distance between religion and reasoning the state implemented a
number of reforms that reinforced the separation between religious symbols and
daily life. Under the 1924 Law on Unification of Education the Kemalists eliminated
religious lessons at public schools and either abolished religious schools or placed
them under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. The law also banned the
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teaching of languages other than Turkish. By eliminating the education of other
languages the government also limited expressions of non-Turkish identities. 190
The Kemalists’ use of language reforms aided their efforts to mold the population
into loyal Turks, but the Kemalists faced significant resistance to these reforms.
Many ethnic and religious groups in the new Republic resisted the state’s
Turkification policies and instead sought to hold on to their individual identities. This
resistance to accepting a Turkish identity was particularly evident in the use of
languages other than Turkish. By continuing to use other languages, ethnic and
religious minority groups attempted to preserve their long-standing status as semiautonomous communities with their own culture. That this resistance to Turkishness
was so visible, domestically and internationally, was particularly troubling to the
Republican leadership.191 The Kemalists took a number of steps to crack down on
the use of languages other than Turkish in response to this display of perceived
defiance. The Republic’s adoption of harsh language policies became one of the
Kemalists’ most important strategies for enforcing a collective Turkish identity.
The Turkish Language Society (Türk Dil Kurumu), founded in 1932, carried out
Turkish language-related activities in support of the state’s official ideology. The
Turkish Language Society also played a significant role in the politicization of
language during the Republican period.192 Its foundation was one of the main turning
points of the Kemalist language revolution. Among the Society’s responsibilities was
the purification of Turkish language through the purging of Arabic and Persian
words.193 By replacing the Arabic script with the Latin script and eliminating the use
of Arabic and Persian words, Kemalists sought to correct the faults of the Ottoman
past. To justify these changes, the Kemal described the Arabic script as a barrier to
the modernization process and the influence of Arabic and Persian as ‘destructive’
and ‘unenlightened;194
So long as Turkish was written from right to left, it could never properly express the ideals of
European civilization. The picturesque involutions and intricacies of Arabic script afforded a
psychological background to the Oriental mentality, which stood as the real enemy of the
Republic.195

The script reform was thus a tool the Kemalist government used to force Turks to
forget their Ottoman-Islamic past. Through the standardization of language the
Kemalists tried to weaken non-Turkish identities. Turkish became the official
language of the state and thus the official language of the education system. 196 That
Turks’ language was no loner written in the script of the Quran also distanced them
from religion. The script reform enabled the government to exert more control over
the spread of information through restrictions on the publishing and re-printing of
documents. As the government gained more control over the publishing process,
writings and publications critical of the government declined until a point where they
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were basically non-existent. This decline in criticism went hand-in-hand with an
increase in state-sponsored knowledge production.197
Immediately after the script reform and language purification process the Kemalist
government swiftly pushed the new Turkish language on the population. In 1928 the
Turkish Parliament passed a law that stated citizens had no more than one year to
switch to the new language. The government then embarked on a nation-wide
campaign to rapidly educate the public by enforcing the new alphabet in primary
schools and establishing a system of mandatory adult education (Millet
Mektepleri). 198 The ‘Citizen! Speak Turkish!’ campaign also pushed the new
language on the population and attempted to eliminate minority languages from the
public sphere.
The speed at which the government carried out this transformation caused
significant problems for the public. In the decade that followed the script reform and
purification process much of the population was unable to understand the new
version of Turkish. The language reformers removed many Arabic and Persian
words before finding suitable replacements. However, these practical challenges did
not stop the government from forcing the public to use the new language. In the
1930 the government arrested hundreds of people for speaking languages other
than Turkish. Turkish speakers also harassed non-Turkish speakers and violently
forced them to speak Turkish. The strict timeline for the public’s adoption of the new
Turkish language was non only a problem for those who did not previously speak a
version of Turkish. While the state forced non-Turkish speakers to learn a new
language, it also forced those who spoke the old version of Turkish to relearn a
language that had once been familiar to them.199
The Kemalists largely overestimated and disregarded the willingness of non-Turks to
adopt Turkishness. It was not enough for the state to force its linguistic, social, and
cultural policies on the population. Non-ethnic Turkish communities had their own
identities and were not passive actors whose identities could be easily molded by
state policies. For the state’s Turkification policies to be effective, there needed to be
a ‘readiness’ of the people to redefine themselves as Turks and adopt state-defined
values of Turkishness. These persistent, harsh policies wore down pre-existing
identities and led to the adoption and resistance of different levels of Turkish identity
among the population.200
Conclusion
The Kemalists sought to bring about a civilizational shift in which a secular, Turkish
nation would replace the religious community inherited from the Ottoman Empire.201
In their efforts to do so, the Kemalist enacted a series of rapid, ruthless reforms that
are often described as ‘radical.’ In comparison to the reforms of the Young Turk era,
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the Kemalists often took their policies further and implemented them faster.
Ideologically speaking, the Kemalists also pursed the most extreme versions of
many concepts popularized during the Young Turk era. The following chapter will
compare each movement’s stance on some of these concepts in an attempt to
highlight the differences and similarities that existed between them.

Chapter 4: In Comparison
This chapter compares and analyzes examples of discontinuity in the ideology and
practices of the Young Turk and Kemalist movements. Through a comparison of key
concepts, this chapter aims to show the inconsistencies in the Young Turk
movement’s thought and practices; the main dissimilarities between the two
movements; and the commonalities between the Kemalists and the garbcılar faction.
Ziya Gökalp’s Link to Kemalism
When retracing the path from Young Turk to Kemalist ideology, one must note that
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ideas constantly fluctuated as a result
of the changing circumstances and influences of the time. Scholars often point to
Gökalp as one of the main influences of Kemalist ideology. But which Gökalp, and
when? Gökalp’s personal ideology underwent numerous transformations in the latter
part of his life. As Heyd’s research on Gökalp shows, Gökalp was not consistent or
systematic in his thoughts. In reviewing the writings from different points of his life,
one can see several changes in his opinions as well as inner contradictions.202
Initially, Gökalp was not a staunch supporter of Westernization. Even once he leaned
into adopting more aspects of Western civilization and culture, he never advocated
its absolute adoption. Early on Gökalp also embraced the development of a Turkish
culture alongside the continued allegiance to the Ottoman Empire, just like many of
his CUP colleagues. He argued for a form of Ottoman unity that incorporated
aspects of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism. He believed these concepts not only
complemented each other, but also were necessary for the survival of the Empire.
He later shifted his view as the Empire suffered losses in the Balkan Wars and the
Turks became an even larger majority of the population. At this time Gökalp moved
farther away from Ottomanism and increasingly focused on the formation of a
distinctly Turkish shared identity. From this point forward Gökalp’s contribution to
Turkish nationalism very much influenced the development of Turkish national
identity under the Kemalists. It is therefore important to emphasize that Kemalist
links to Gökalp’s ideology were at their strongest point after he departed from his
original beliefs.
Just like many Young Turks, Gökalp’s ideology underwent many transformations.
Gökalp’s ideology certainly influenced that of the Kemalists, particularly regarding
the development of Turkish identity, but Kemalist ideology in turn influenced
Gökalp’s. While Gökalp’s views on Turkish nationalism grew stronger throughout the
For more details on Ziya Gökalp’s life and ideology see Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism:
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late years of the Ottoman Empire, his original beliefs (a mixture of Ottomanism and
pan-Turkism) did not fall in line with the ideology later adopted by the Kemalists.
Gökalp also remained supportive of the inclusion of non-ethnic Turks in the state’s
definition of Turkishness, despite the Kemalists’ shift towards an identity where race
and ethnicity were core components:
There are fellow citizens in our country whose ancestors have come from Albania or Arabia
sometime in the past. If they have been educated as Turks, and have become used to
working for the Turkish ideal, we must not set them apart from other citizens. How can we
consider as aliens those who have shared not only our blessings but also our misfortunes? In
particular, how can we say, “you are not Turks” to those among them who have made great
sacrifices and have performed great service for the Turkish nation? 203

This is not to say that Gökalp did not make significant contributions to the
development of Kemalist ideology and practices. Instead, it shows the need for
current scholarship to acknowledge the areas where Gökalp and other contributors
to Kemalist ideology differed and where they made compromises in their personal
beliefs.

Embracing Western Civilization
There was a wide variation between the members of the Young Turk movement
regarding the necessary extent of Westernizing reforms. Berkes divides supporters
and opponents of westernizing reforms into three schools of thought: Islamists,
Turkists, and Westernists (garbcilar).204 If we place these groups on a spectrum, the
Islamists would be at one end, the Turkists in the middle (but closer to the
Westernists), and the Westernists at the other end.
The stance of the Islamists on Westernization can be best summarized by the
following quotes, both which appeared in the Young Turk publication Sırat-ı
Müstakim:
European behavior is utterly contrary not only to Islam but to the principles of any social
life…What painful wounds the European civil laws have opened on social life in terms of
morals and ethics is obvious…It is true that we have…to benefit from European civilization,
industry and knowledge; and yet it is absolutely imperative for us…not to allow their customs,
morals and conduct to enter into our countries.205
…If we ever run our affairs according to European principles, the moral degeneration, which
has fallen upon them will be inevitable for us.206

The Islamists strongly opposed the Empire adopting anything but science and
technology from the West, as they believed Western morals were contrary to Islam
and would ruin the Empire. In discussions of the Ottoman Empire embracing
Western civilization, supporters of different schools of thought often placed aspects
into “good” and “bad” categories. One Islamist, Musa Kazim, even attempted to
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create an “Islamic formula” to determine which aspects of Western civilization the
Empire should and should not adopt.207
Throughout the nineteenth century anti-Western sentiments appeared in publications
such as Sura-yi Ummet and Türk, where authors described European powers as
imperialistic and enemies of the Ottoman Empire.208 The West’s stance during the
Balkan Wars reinforced many of the anti-Western views already held by members of
the Young Turk movement. European powers’ reluctance to intervene on behalf of
the Empire was widely criticized in Young Turk publications and later in its members’
memoirs.209 Enver Pasha, one of the most prominent military leaders in the CUP,
was amongst those who believed that the West was the primary cause of the
Empire’s misery and suffering.210
The stance of the Islamists was drastically different from the Westernists, who
believed not only in the adoption of Western technologies and sciences, but also
culture and morals. The Westernist movement fell under the leadership of Abdullah
Cevdet, the most ardent secularist of the Yong Turk movement. Following the
Balkan Wars, the Westernist movement split into two wings: one under the
leadership of Celal Nuri and the other under Cevdet. Nuri was critical of the West but
supported partial Westernization, that is, the “adoption of Western science and
technology and preservation of Ottoman culture, a major component of which was
Islam.”211 In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars Nuri’s views on the West continued to
grow apart from Cevdet’s and the two began a widely publicized argument. In 1913
Nuri wrote in İctihad that, “friendship for the West is the vilest of all crimes I can
imagine. A nation incapable of hating the West is doomed to extinction.” 212 In
response, Cevdet published an article in which he said:
We deemed every good thing coming from them bad. We are the culprits of all our plights.
We are to be accused…The relation between Europe and us is the relation between strength
and weakness, between science and ignorance…Yes, Europe means supremacy; let hatred
of it be far from me. My hatred is turned against those things that are the obstacles to our
attaining power equal to that of Europe…Our mortal enemy is our own inertia, ignorance,
fanaticism, and our own blind following of tradition…The West is our teacher; to love it is to
love science, progress, material and moral advancement…We have to understand one
thing—there are not two civilizations, there is only one to which to turn, and that is Western
civilization, which we must take into our hands whether it be rosy or thorny… 213

Although Nuri recognized that the Ottoman state needed to adopt Western material
improvements, he rejected Western cultural, social, and spiritual values. This was in
stark contrast to Cevdet, who believed in the complete adoption of Western
civilization and the complete separation of religion and state. Cevdet and his fellow
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garbcılar also believed Islam created a mental barrier that kept Muslims from
understanding both their own ills and Western civilization.
Cevdet himself was well known among Ottoman intellectuals for his idea of a
Westernized society where religion would play no role.214 As Cevdet continued to
publish these seemingly extreme views in his journal, Ictihad, the CUP distanced
themselves from him and his anti-religious stances. Nuri and Cevdet’s stances
represent the divide that existed even among the garbcılar and further highlight the
multiple strands of opinions that existed within the broader Young Turk movement.
Not only can its members be divided into three broad schools of thought, but also by
their extent of support for concepts within each school of thought.
It is important to emphasize that Nuri was not the only supporter of partial
westernization; other intellectuals, including many prominent leaders of the Young
Turk movement, also shared this attitude. This idea was widely accepted among
Turkist (and Islamist) intellectuals, while Cevdet’s appeal for total westernization was
cast off as ‘radical’. Berkes, notes that:
The Westernists’ ideas deviated radically from the prevalent view of Westernization,
formulated by Ahmed Midhat. The essence of Westernization in their eyes would be a radical
moral and mental transformation. The greatest problem was to cast aside the old system of
values in order to develop a new morality based upon the Western system of values. In other
words, modernization was to the new Westernists a cultural and moral issues far more than a
material one.215

Neither overly anti- nor pro-Western, the Turkists partially accepted Western
civilization but also believed the ‘radical’ Westernists views promoted by Cevdet and
his followers were a threat to the development of a collective Turkish identity.
However, the Turkists believed in the adoption of far more aspects of Western
civilization than the Islamists. The Turkists opted for Turkish culture that was neither
overtly Western nor Islamic and believed that without Turkish culture there could be
no genuine reform or modernization of the Empire. The Turkists also did not flat out
reject religion and thought it would still play a limited role in their vision of a
secularized society. Gökalp identified himself as a Turkist but also shared the views
of some ‘moderate’ Westernists.216 He embraced a Turkish identity that had Turkish,
Islamic, and European characteristics.217
Unlike Gökalp and other moderate Young Turks, the Kemalists did not differentiate
between civilization (in their minds: science and technology) and culture. The
Kemalists thought it was ‘unnecessary and difficult’ to separate the two from each
other and advocated for the complete adoption of Western civilization, thus aligning
their beliefs with Cevdet and the garbcılar more than Gökalp. The many Kemalist
reforms aimed at adopting Western cultural exemplify how they embraced the culture
and norms of Western civilization.
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As detailed above, the vast majority of Young Turk intellectuals believed in some
form of Westernization, yet there was much debate as to what type and extent of
Westernization reforms should be implemented. If we look at the Young Turk
members’ support for Westernization on a spectrum, Kemal and his supporters
would appear at the far end with the garbcılar. The Kemalists described themselves
as the most extreme Westernists and believed in the total and complete adoption of
Western civilization, just like Cevdet and his fellow garbcılar.
The CUP’s Central Committee widely perceived Cevdet to be the most radical
member of the Young Turk movement with regards to his stance on Westernization.
As Cevdet continuously published his ideas in journals and other publications the
Central Committee attempted to distance themselves from him, as his views did not
fall in line with theirs. The CUP felt that Cevdet’s extreme stance on the complete
adoption of Western civilization and the exclusion of religion from a unified identity
would threaten their efforts to appeal to greater the Ottoman population. Cevdet and
his fellow garbcılar aligned more closely with the members of the Kemalists
movement than the leaders of the CUP. Cevdet’s wing of the garbcılar undoubtedly
influenced Kemalist reforms of the early Turkish Republic. Kemal himself even
acknowledged this, telling Cevdet in 1925: “Doctor, until now you have written about
many things. Now we may bring them to realization.”218 Kemal also publicly spoke of
the Kemalists desire for the total and complete adoption of Western civilization:
We have to be civilized persons in every aspect…Our opinions, our thoughts will be civilized
from head to toe. We shall not take heed of nonsensical words. Look at the entire Turkish and
Islamic world, in what grave and difficult situation they are because their ideas and thoughts
are not adapted to the reforms made by imperative civilization… 219

The Westernization plan put forth by the garbcılar in 1913 laid out many of the
‘radical’ ideas the Kemalist regime would later adopt during the early years of the
Republic.220 In their plan, the garbcılar criticized ‘outdated’ practices and manners
they believed did not fall in line with Western civilization. The plan’s
recommendations included: abolishing dervish lodges, medreses and the fez (and
replacing it with a European style hat), adopting modern clothing and European
‘good’ manners, and the emancipation of women. Shortly after the establishment of
the Turkish Republic the Kemalist regime began implementing many of these ideas
and in some cases took them one step further.
In their pursuit of modernity the Kemalists “openly and wholeheartedly chose to
imitate the West, even in purely superficial things.”221 A central aspect of Kemalist
reforms was the desire to change the outward appearance of society. Kemalists’
insistence on changing the people’s appearances was tied to their belief that one’s
outward appearance reflected their inner feelings and thoughts. Kemalists hoped to
create a transformation in society’s manners and reasoning ability by implementing
stringent rules on individual’s clothing, language, and overall style. 222 In 1925 the
government enforced a strict dress code that forbid individuals from wearing
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traditional Ottoman headgear, the turban, and fez, and instead required them to wear
Western-style hats. For women, the state strongly discouraged veiling. To inspire the
expansion of Western clothing styles the government increased imports of European
goods and spread images of Europeans.223 During the 1920s, the Kemalist-aligned
newspaper Cumhuriyet frequently published images of men and women dressed in
Western-styled clothing to show the public examples of how they should dress.224
Kemalists tied the embrace of Western clothing styles and appearances directly to
the success of the nation: “There is no way to be successful with turbans and robes,
now we have proven to the world that we are a civilized nation.”225 The same went
for Western morals and traditions: “…nations cannot maintain their existence by ageold rotten mentalities and by tradition-worshipping…Superstitions and nonsense
have to be thrown out of our heads.” 226 The Kemalists’ stance on adopting all
aspects of Western civilization was very clear and reforms in the early Republican
era directly supported this stance.

Violence and Forced Assimilation
Regarding the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, both the Young Turk and
Kemalist leadership carried out violent, inhumane policies with the intention of
homogenizing the population. However, their motivations for carrying out these
policies and the extent of them differed. While the Young Turks carried out genocide
against the Armenian community with the aim of further homogenizing the Empire by
physical eliminating them, the Kemalists carried out harsh, violent measures aimed
at forcibly assimilating minority groups and eliminating their identities. This does not
mean, however, that there was no overlap in the intentions and policies of the Young
Turks and the Kemalists.
For the members of the Young Turk movement, the primary goal was saving the
state, which they attempted to do through strengthening the position of the Ottoman
Muslims, and later the majority Turkish population. The Balkan Wars contributed to
the Young Turks’ growing mistrust towards religious and ethnic minority
communities, who they saw as disloyal to the Empire. The CUP leadership used this
goal to legitimize their violent measures against the non-Muslim populations of the
Empire, particularly the Ottoman Armenian community. According to Ottoman
population censuses from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Armenians
and Greeks were the two largest ethnic groups after the Turks.227 The size of the
Armenian community, along with its perceived resistance to CUP policies and desire
for autonomy, deepened the CUP leadership’s pre-existing belief that the Armenians
posed a threat to the existence of the Empire.
As early as 1909, merely one year after the revolution, members of the Young Turk
leadership—namely, Talat Pasha, Doctor Nizam Bey and Behaeddin Sakir—began
Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Ataturk’s
Turkey. p. 112.
224 Cumhuriyet Gazetesi. Daily editions from 7 May – 31 August 1924. Basbakanlik Kutuphanesi.
225 Kemal quoted in Cumhuriyet (17 September 1928). No. 1566, p. 1.
226 Kemal quoted in Türk Yurdu (1924). No. 1.
227 These censuses only showed data for the Empire’s three largest populations: Turks, Greeks and
Armenians. “Proportions des populations musulmanes, grecques et armeniennes en Asie-Mineure
d’apres la statistique du Livre-Jaune, 1893-1897” and “1914.” FO 371/7873.
223

47

discussing the possibility of forcefully homogenizing Ottoman territory. The Young
Turks discussed this idea in detail until 1914, when they put it into action. In 1910,
the CUP held a secret conference Salonika where its leaders produced a document
outlining the decision to proceed with violent measures against the Empire’s
Armenian population.228 The document, which officials at the British Foreign Office
gave the name ‘The Ten Commandments’, outlined a number of actions to be taken:
Close all Armenian societies, and arrest all who worked against the Government at any time
among them and send them into provinces such as Baghdad and Mosul, and wipe them out
either on the road or there;
Apply measures to exterminate all males under 50, priests and teachers, leave girls and
children to be Islamized;
Carry away the families of all who succeed in escaping and apply measures to cut them off
from all connection with their native place;
On the ground that Armenian officials may be spies, expel and drive them out absolutely from
every Government department or post;
Kill off in an appropriate manner all Armenians in the Army.229

Additionally, the document emphasized the need for these actions to be done
simultaneously, in order to leave the Armenians no time to defend themselves. 230
While a number of CUP officials attended the conference mentioned above, there is
still much debate as to whether or not lower-ranking CUP members and members
outside the Central Committee were aware of the plan proposed in ‘The Ten
Commandments’, and if they were, to what extent.231
The ruling CUP’s view of the Armenian population as a barrier to progress and a
threat to the Empire’s security sharpened after the Balkan Wars. The CUP observed
the Armenian community’s increasing desire for autonomy and feared their possible
separation from the Empire, something that was unthinkable to the CUP after the
territorial losses in the Balkan Wars. The Balkan Wars amplified the CUP
leadership’s efforts to save the Empire through weakening the positions of the
Empire’s religious and ethnic minority communities.
The procedures outlined in above-mentioned document were well under way by
1914. The CUP chose to respond to the challenged presented by the Armenian
population in the most inhumane way, with the Armenian genocide. By 1916 the
Armenian population of the Empire drastically decreased due to widespread
massacres, forced emigrations, and violence against the Armenian community.232 As
part of these measures against the Armenian population the CUP leadership
enacted the Deportation Law in 1915, under which they forcibly exiled any subjects
that opposed the government during times of war. The Deportation Law largely
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targeted the Armenian population, but also affected other religious and ethnic
minority groups, Assyrians and Kurds.233
The Kemalists justified their nation-building project as one of necessity. They saw
the creation of a homogenous nation-state as a requirement of Western acceptance
and the key to joining the Western world. 234 However, the population of the new
Republic, while overwhelmingly ethnic Turkish and Muslim, was still far from
homogeneous. This prompted the Kemalists to embark on an increasingly intense
program of Turkification throughout the first two decades of the Republic.
The 1924 Constitution’s proclamation that, “The People of Turkey, regardless of
religion and race, are Turks as regards citizenship,” evidences the government’s first
attempt to include ethnic and religious minority groups in its vision of Turkishness.235
The Kemalists envisioned the creation of a unified population whose identities
aligned with a state-produced definition of Turkishness. Since the population of the
new Republic was by no means homogenous, the Kemalists attempted to
consolidate minority groups with the expectation that they would willingly assimilate.
Kemalists hoped that the inclusion of ethnic and religious minorities in their vision of
Turkish national identity would strengthen the state’s authority. 236 This directly
contrasted with the Young Turks, who opted for the exclusion of ethnic and religious
minorities instead of the consolidation of them. The Kemalists viewed the Kurdish
population of the Republic similarly to how the Young Turks viewed the Armenian
population: a challenge that needed a solution. However, the Kemalists and the
Young Turks approached these challenges in different ways.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman state had an ambivalent
attitude towards the Kurdish population. At that time the Kurds had an indisputable
public presence in the Empire; they had their own political, social, and cultural
organizations. Following the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 there was a
definitive shift in attitude towards the Kurdish population. In attempting to mold the
population into a homogeneous body of loyal, Turkish citizens, the government made
the decision to ignore the multiplicity of identities that existed in the Republic,
particularly Kurdish identity.237
The Kemalists used the language in the Treaty of Lausanne to justify their actions
towards the Kurds and Kurdish identity. The Treaty protected the rights of minorities,
including their right to language. However, the Treaty defined minorities in terms of
religion, not ethnicity. This meant that only non-Muslims, such as Orthodox Greek
Christians, Armenians, Assyrian Christians, and Jews, officially received protections
under the Treaty. The Kemalists used the fact that the Kurdish community was not
protected as a minority under the Treaty to legitimize their harsh attempts to forcibly
assimilate the Kurds and effectively reduce their visibility in the new Republic. 238
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As the Kemalists attempted to unify the new Republic under one identity they tried to
prohibit the Kurds, and other groups, from operating outside of this identity. Through
increasingly intense Turkification policies the Kemalists sought to eliminate nonTurkish identities from the public sphere. These measures applied to all ethnic and
religious minorities, but overwhelmingly targeted the Kurds.239 In the most heavily
populated Kurdish areas of the Republic the government inscribed nationalistic
symbols and slogans on buildings and destroyed monuments that referenced the
Kurds. The state closed Kurdish schools and institutions, ceased Kurdish-language
publications, and banned references to ‘Kurds’, ‘Kurdish’, or ‘Kurdistan’.240
The Kurds were the largest non-Turkish speaking community in the new Republic.
They were also the ethnic community that showed the most visible resistance to
Turkification reforms. Between 1923 and 1938 eighteen rebellions broke out, 17 of
which took place in the Republic’s Kurdish provinces.241 The Kemalists responded to
the Kurdish community’s defiance with strict, violent policies and crackdowns.
However, unlike the Young Turks before them, the Kemalists did not resort to
genocide when taking action against the Kurdish community. This points to the
Kemalists’ underlying belief that the government could succeed in forcing the Kurds
to assimilate, which they believed would in turn strengthen their authority. The Young
Turks resorted to more violent measures in part because they realized they would
not be able to succeed in homogenizing the population through a shared identity.
The Young Turks’ inability to come to a consensus on whether to pursue
Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, or pan-Islamism certainly contributed to the difficulty they
faced in attempting to unite the Ottoman population under a single identity.
The Kemalist government’s systematic denial and oppression of Kurdish identity
through violent Turkification policies concentrated on what Haig refers to as the
‘invisibilisation’ of the Kurdish identity.242 The evolution of the Kemalist narrative on
Turkish identity also shows how they never fully gave up on this goal. By the 1930s
the Kemalist narrative implied race and ethnicity were core components of
Turkishness, yet the government continued to force the Republic’s ethnic and
religious minorities to speak, appear, and behave as ‘Turks’. Cagaptay points out
that while Kemalist ideology focused on Turkish race and ethnicity, the government
“kept the avenues of assimilation open to those who were not ethnically Turkish.”243
In his research Zeydaniloğlu says the government treated the Kurds as Turks who
had forgotten their Turkishness. This was the Kemalists’ solution to finding a way to
include the Kurds in their version of Turkish national identity. This hope to integrate
the Kurdish population into the nation-state guided Kemalists’ forced Turkification
policies.244 While the Kemalists suppressed Kurdish rebellions and resistance, often
violently, they did not seek to physically eliminate the Kurds from the Republic.
Instead, they sought to eliminate their identity.
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The Kemalists anticipated that ethnic and religious minorities would assimilate and
follow the set guidelines of Turkishness put forth by the state. These individuals were
expected to declare their allegiance to the state, adopt Turkish culture and language,
and embrace their Turkish national identity. However, this did not happen. Not
surprisingly, these groups pushed back against the state’s harsh Turkification
policies in an effort to hold on to their ethnic and religious identities. The Kemalists
did not tolerate this and used the defiance of the Republic’s minorities as justification
to implement policies that were even more extreme and restrictive. The Kemalist
regime also cracked down on any and all of its opponents – especially Kurdish
religious leaders and former members of the CUP.
In 1925, Shekih Said, a Kurdish religious leader, led a rebellion in Diyarbakir and
Mardin that aimed to revive the recently abolished Caliphate. To mobilize support,
Sheikh Said drew on elements of Kurdish nationalism. The Kemalists quickly and
violently suppressed the rebellion, sentencing nearly fifty people to death for their
involvement. The Kemalists used the Sheikh Said Rebellion as an opportunity to
further consolidate the concept of Turkishness as a modern, secular, national
identity. 245 After the rebellion the Kemalists imposed stricter regulations on the
Kurdish population, expanding limitations on their language and culture. As part of
these restrictions the state issued the “Breakdown of Turkish Unity” circular, which
forbid citizens from using the names ‘Kurds’, ‘Laz’, ‘Circassian’, ‘Kurdistan’, or
‘Lazistan’ and from discussing these topics.246
To expand control over the Republic’s religious and ethnic minority populations the
state enacted two different resettlement policies, similar to their Young Turk
predecessors. The first Resettlement Law, enacted in 1926, prohibited non-Muslims
from the former Empire from immigrating to the Republic.247 The second, enacted in
1934, stated that anyone the state believed was not fully Turkish could be resettled
by the state.248 This law categorized the country into zones tied to different levels of
‘Turkishness’. The state used this law to strategically resettle ethnic and religious
minorities in distinctly Turkish areas, thus dispersing concentrations of non-Muslim,
non-Turkish communities throughout the country. 249 Article 11 of this law directly
targeted the Kurds and ordered them to be distributed so they made up no more
than ten percent of a district’s population.250
On top of these measures, the Kemalists arranged a forced population transfer
between Greece and Turkey in 1923. The agreement was based on religion and
ethnicity and did not take language into consideration. As a result, many Greekspeaking Muslims and Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox Christians were forced
from their homes. Approximately 1.2 million Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox
Christians were sent to Greece while 600,000 Greek-speaking Muslims came to
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Turkey. 251 Here we see similarities with the CUP, who ordered the exchange of
200,000 Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians from Western Thrace and Anatolia in
1914.

Boundaries of Nationalism
The Young Turk movement constantly evolved. The CUP took on multiple identities
based on transformations in its ideology, leadership, and membership. Taking into
consideration the size of the Young Turk movement, it was inevitable that not all its
members would be in agreement on many of the issues championed by the CUP’s
Central Committee. Early on the CUP proposed a multiplicity of solutions to the
Empire’s demise as a way to attract more support. The CUP strategically used
rhetoric that catered to the Muslim/Turkish population, non-Muslim/non-Turkish
population, or the Western powers.
The frequent contradictions of decisions and ideas within the Young Turk movement
evidence the disconnect that existed between the Central Committee, the CUP’s
executive branch, its provincial branches, and smaller factions and offshoots. The
CUP’s official publications and communications include numerous examples of
members promoting one policy while the Central Committee simultaneously
attempted to implement a contradicting policy. 252 In British Foreign Office
documents, British officials noted the use of conflicting rhetoric. They observed that
while the Young Turks did endorse Pan-Islamism in many parts of the Empire, it was
“discouraged in regions where it might endanger Turkish authority.” 253 Numerous
memos between British foreign officials between the years 1914 and 1919 further
highlight the confusion over the CUP’s ideology and practices.
One document notes that while the CUP adopted a Pan-Islamic program by 1911,
one of the party’s official organs also said that, “the pursuit of the Pan-Islamic
designs...would be contrary to our dearest interests.”254 Another memo received from
the British Foreign Secretary in 1917 states, “To my certain knowledge, the PanIslamic ideas are being taught at schools…this gives us an idea of the vast efforts
being made to advance the gospel of Pan-Islamism.” 255 Another memo to the
Foreign Office in 1919 discusses an article published in the Cairo-based, Arabiclanguage monthly publication Manar and said that Enver Bey Pasha was “quoted for
the declaration that a new constitution would have nothing to do with PanIslamism”.256 Yet another set of memos discussed British officials’ understanding that
“a number of prominent Young Turks were actively working with the Khedive and
Nationalist party along Pan-Islamic lines” and that “Pan-Islamic activities have
become more intensive.” The same memo also noted that,
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The Young Turks…who are far from devout Moslems, found the Pan-Islamic force ready
made and assert that they have to use it internally to counteract national tendencies among
the Mohammedan Arabs and Kurds of the Empire, and in foreign affairs as a lever to compel
foreign governments, e.g., that of Great Britain, to hesitate when there is a question of brining
pressure to bear in the case of a conflict of interest.257

These documents provide examples of the confusion that surrounded the aims and
ideology of the Young Turk movement during this time. An analysis of Türk Yurdu
provides additional examples of how CUP leadership simultaneously promoted
aspects of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism. In their study on Turkish
nationalist content in Türk Yurdu, Balkilic and Dolek note that,
…one can see the articles which stated Islam was historically a vital element of Turkish
identity and the idea of religion was not by definition against the idea of nationalism, and the
articles which elaborated Islam as one of the causes of the disappearance of Turkish
nationalist identity at the same time in the journal. 258

Throughout the journal’s publication there was no clear departure from the ideas of
Ottomanism or Islamism, though there was less of a focus on these ideas after the
Balkan Wars. The lack of a distinct rupture in the CUP’s ideology contributes to the
ongoing difficulty in identifying and analyzing the Young Turk movement’s official
ideology. It also points to the many variations in the movement’s ideology since
some of the journal’s authors, like Yusuf Akçura, used it as a platform to express
their personal beliefs while others used it to cater to non-Turkish or non-Muslim
readers. 259
More than anything, the multiplicity of ideas put forth by the CUP evidence their
opportunism, a trait they have in common with the leaders of the Kemalist
movement. Just like the leaders of the CUP, Kemal and his colleagues used Islamic
rhetoric and undertones to mobilize Ottoman Muslims to join the nationalist
movement’s efforts, which they said were in support of defending and protecting the
Sultanate and Caliphate. Among the goals they outlined in the declaration of the
Sivas Congress in 1919 and the Turkish National pact were the “conservation,”
“safeguarding” and “continued existence” of the Sultanate and the Caliphate as well
as the “defense of the rights of the Caliphate and the throne.”260
However, the Kemalists’ use of Islamic rhetoric came to an abrupt halt upon the
establishment of the Republic. Upon the proclamation of the Republic they promptly
dissolved the Caliphate and Sultanate and with it their need to gather support from
the Muslim conservatives. From this point on the Kemalists were clear about their
intentions to create a Turkish nation state and increase the separation between
religion and society. They no longer attempted to appeal to the population’s religious
sentiments. Instead, the Kemalists wanted to call attention to the population’s link to
its ethnic-Turkish ancestry. In doing this the Kemalists strategically produced broad
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definitions of Turkishness and Turkish identity, leaving them open for interpretation
as they saw fit. The two statements that follow exemplify the Kemalists’ use of broad
language to appeal to the Republic’s population:
“The People of Turkey, regardless of religion and race are Turks as regards citizenship.” 261
- Türk Anayasası, 1924
“Any individual within the Republic of Turkey, whatever his faith, who speaks Turkish, grows
up with the Turkish culture and adopts the Turkish ideal, is a Turk.” 262
- Tarih IV Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, 1931

During the Ottoman era the boundaries of pan-Turkism and Turkish nationalism were
not always clearly defined. Often the difference between the two was a matter of
emphasis rather than a sharp division.263 When the Kemalists rose to power, this
was not the case. Kemalists firmly rejected all notions of pan-Turkism, choosing
instead to adopt full-on Turkish nationalism.
Even prior the proclamation of the Republic, in 1921, Kemal spoke of a new policy
that would include Turks living within the “national frontiers” of Turkey, effectively
shutting down the idea that Turkish nationalism would extend beyond the country’s
borders. 264 This marked a distinctive shift away from pan-Turkism and towards a
form of civic nationalism based on one’s loyalty to the state.265 The state’s focus on
the Republic’s borders as a requirement of Turkish identity and citizenship was
arguably one of the most consistent aspects of Kemalists national identity. While
there was some flexibility in the racial and ethnic requirements for Turkishness, the
territorial requirements remained fixed. In choosing to tie Turkish nationalism to the
boundaries of the Republic, the Kemalists closed the door to pan-Turkism. Kemalists
flatly rejected Ottomanism, pan-Turkism, and pan-Islamism and instead pursued a
version of Turkish nationalism that centered on lifting up and developing the
inhabitants of Anatolia, the proclaimed homeland of the Turks.
The Kemalists remained conflicted over two main aspects of Turkish nationalism.
They wanted to appeal to the emotions of Turks living within the Republic’s borders
but did not want to over-emphasize cultural links to Turks living outside the Republic.
The Kemalists did not support pan-Turkism, but struggled with how to connect Turks
in the Republic to their Turkish heritage and history without also appealing to Turks
in Central Asia. While the Kemalists took decisive steps to rid the Republic of panTurkist sentiments, they simultaneously made an effort to create a collective
consciousness about Turks’ links to their ancestors.266
The Kemalists did not want to promote a strictly ethnic definition of Turkish
nationalism since it would extend to Turks outside the Republic’s borders. Ethnic
requirements for Turkish nationalism would also exclude the Republic’s non-Turkish
groups, particularly those in Anatolia, which the state sought to include in its vision of
Türk Anayasası [Turkish Constitution] (1924), Article 88.
Tarih IV Turkiye Cumhuriyeti (Istanbul, 1931).
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Turkish national identity. Kemal and his supporters believed their inclusion in this
vision would help strengthen the legitimacy and authority of the Republic. 267 During
the Turkish-Greek War Kemal and the nationalists received the support of many
Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims living in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. They helped
fight for the area that would go on to become the Republic of Turkey, which they saw
as their homeland. 268 These inhabitants included many Muslim refugees from the
Balkans and Caucasus who resettled in Anatolia during the nineteenth century. For
these inhabitants who had fled inter-religious war and violence, it was important for
them to claim and defend their Anatolian homeland.269
The Kemalists actively suppressed pan-Turkism because it emphasized unity with
Turks outside of the Republic’s borders, a collective identity that the state had less
control over. The restriction and eventual disbandment of the Turkish Hearth
organization’s activities in the early years of the Republic exemplifies one of the
steps Kemalists took to tightly control the spread of pan-Turkist sentiments. The
Turkish Hearth organization, originally established in 1912 to promote a mix of
Turkism and Turkish nationalism, was essential in the spread of pan-Turkist ideas.
The activities of the Turkish Hearth had no defined boundaries, as the territory of the
Ottoman Empire consistently shifted during the centuries leading up to its collapse.
Its efforts were therefore not tied to the borders of the Empire at all times.270
After the Greco-Turkish War the Kemalists brought the Turkish Hearth under the
control of the government and shifted the focus of its activities. The Kemalists firmly
believed in a Turkish nationalism that did not extend beyond the borders of the
Republic, thus they did not support pan-Turkism. To bring the Turkish Hearth in line
with this belief the Kemalists redefined the role and purpose of the Turkish Hearth to
focus on two main areas: defending the values of nationalism and promoting the new
reforms. The new overarching goal of the Turkish Hearth centered on educating the
Turkish people on Turkish nationalism.271
In 1924, the second article of the Turkish constitution stated the official purpose of
the Turkish Hearth as working “to develop Turkish culture while strengthening
national consciousness among all Turks, to work towards…cultural progress and
towards the development of the national economy.”272 In the following three years
the state took measures to scale back the Turkish Hearth’s activities and in 1927
officially restricted its activities to the boundaries of the Republic. 273 By 1931 the
state officially disbanded the Turkish Hearth organization. 274 The decision to shut
down the Turkish Hearth organization represented an attempt to further eliminate
pan-Turkist sentiments. Ironically, parallel to this the state began crafting the Turkish
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History Thesis, which drew on a degree of pan-Turkist sentiments to rally citizens
around Turkish national unity.
The Turkish History Thesis tied Turks to their ancestors of Central Asia and made
the claim that Turks were the first great civilization. It claimed all civilizations could
be traced back to the Turks, except the Ottomans. The Thesis explained that Central
Asia was not only the foundation of the Turks, but of all of humanity. From Central
Asia, the Turks then spread across the world. The Thesis also argued that Anatolia
was one of the most ‘racially pure’ areas of Turkishness. 275 This helped the
Kemalists legitimize the foundation of the Republic as it created a strong link
between the citizens and the land they inhabited.276
This narrative decisively left out any ties to the Ottoman-Islamic past in an attempt to
separate the Turks from the perceived failures of the former Empire. The references
to the Ottomans that did appear painted them as responsible for breaking the Turks’
ties to the Western world, thus making Ottomans directly responsible for the
Republic’s problems. 277 This narrative helped the Kemalists further legitimize their
struggle against the Republic’s Ottoman-Islamic past and their insistence to
eliminate all traces of it from the collective public consciousness.

Education and Language
The rapid spread of printed material helped facilitate the simplification of language,
particularly during the late decades of the Ottoman Empire. Early attempts to reform
the Empire’s written and spoken language began in 1911 with a literary group called
the Young Pens (Genç Kalemler), who published a journal by the same name. Their
goal was to eliminate the distinction between the Empire’s written and spoken
language. Among the authors of the group’s journal was Ziya Gökalp. In the journal
he opposed the continuation of separate spoken and written languages and
advocated for the two to be condensed. As part of this plan he promoted the
‘purification’ of the Turkish language. In his version of language purification, he
called for the removal of some, but not all, foreign words. 278 Efforts by the Genç
Kalemler and other Ottoman intellectuals aimed at simplifying and reforming the
language, not intervening in the structure of the state. This directly contrasted with
the efforts of the Kemalists, who changed not only the Turkish language itself but
also its symbolism and usage.
The CUP attempted to push Ottoman Turkish on the Empire’s population through the
Turkish Hearth. For the CUP though, language did not represent a prerequisite for
identity in the same way the Kemalists’ new version of the Turkish language did.
While the CUP pushed Turkish instruction and education on Ottoman subjects, it still
permitted the establishment of some minority schools that provided language and
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literature classes.279 The Kemalists not only pushed, but forcibly required subjects of
the Republic to adopt and use the new Turkish language. In 1935 Prime Minister
İsmet İnönü bluntly stated: “From now on, we will not keep quiet. All citizens, who
live with us, will speak Turkish.”280
Kemalists conceptions of nationalism had firm roots in language, culture and
common ideals. Kemal and his associates emphasized the role language played in
the new Republic and how the adoption of the Turkish language fit into national
identity. The Turkish language became an integral part of Turkish national identity.
Being Turkish meant speaking only Turkish, and non-Turkish speakers were viewed
as foreigners in the eyes of the state:
“One of the significant characteristics of the nation is language. One, who regards himself as
a member of the Turkish nation, should first of all and in every case, speak Turkish. If,
someone, who does not speak Turkish, claims membership to Turkish culture and
community, it would not be right to believe this.” 281
One of the obvious qualities of nationality is language. He must first speak the Turkish
language who says that he belongs to the Turkish nationality. If the one does not speak the
Turkish language it is not true to believe that a person who claims his devotion to Turkish
society and culture.282

The issue of language was one of the areas where Gökalp, the proclaimed father of
Turkish nationalism, and the Kemalists did not completely agree. The idea of
reforming the Ottoman language had firm roots with the garbcılar. Both Cevdet and
Nuri advocated for the adoption of the Latin alphabet during the Second
Constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire. Gökalp, on the other hand, rejected the
replacement of Arabic and Persian words with Turkish ones and only supported
eliminating foreign words that existed alongside Turkish synonyms. 283 He believed
that eliminating Arabic and Persian would destroy the language and that all the
imported words had already become Turkish since the Turks were using them. The
Kemalists surpassed Gökalp’s ideas on language reform in choosing to discard all
Arabic and Persian words and replace the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet.
This move was in line with the Kemalists’ efforts to invoke a full-scale break from the
Republic’s Islamic and Ottoman past. According to the Kemalists the Arabic script
set Turkey apart from the West and remained a link to the Ottoman Empire. The
Kemalists forced the new language on the country’s population suddenly and with
minimal warning. Publications quickly appeared in the new language and the state
implemented a ban on the printing of Arabic and Persian publications, including
religious texts.284 Cities and towns received new, Turkish names. Street signs in the
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new language appeared overnight and Turkish education began in state schools.
The country had a mere six months to read, write and speak a new version of
Turkish stripped of its Ottoman vocabulary and written in an unfamiliar script. 285
Accompanying legislation forbid the use of languages other than Turkish, preventing
the Republic’s inhabitants from reading and writing the language of their Ottoman
past. Those who did not read, write, and speak Turkish received fines and even
punishments.286 The state also forced citizens to adopt Turkish surnames, mandated
by the Law of Surnames passed in 1934.287 This reformation and use of the new
Turkish language pushed the Republic further away from its Ottoman past and closer
to a cohesive Turkish national identity, fostered by state intervention and restrictions.
“Writing history is as important as making history.”
– Mustafa Kemal Atatürk288

Another important aspect of the Kemalist reform package was the rewriting of
Turkish history. In the official narrative of the Kemalists, and largely by Kemal himself
during his seven-day speech (Nutuk), Turkey was described as a brand new state
with no ties to the former Ottoman Empire. The state claimed Turkey inherited
nothing from the Ottoman period and described the Empire as “backwards.” In
conjunction with this, Turkey was likened to a phoenix that had risen from the ashes
of the deceased Empire.289
The creation of a new Turkish history became one of the primary projects of the new
Turkish state. Kemalist hand-picked scholars to write the Turkish History Thesis,
which aimed to show that the Turks were and had always been a civilized nation and
that they had priority over other ethnicities (namely Greeks and Armenians) in their
Anatolian homeland.290 The goal was to make the history of the Turks known to the
world and to serve as a source of national inspiration, especially for the Turkish
youth. The Turkish History Thesis signified that Turkishness consisted of racial,
ethnic, historical, and linguistic elements.

Secularism
The Kemalists’ secularizing reforms went far beyond those promoted by the CUP,
and in some cases even by the garbcılar. Kemalist efforts went beyond separating
state and religion, as the leaders of the Young Turk movement envisioned. The
Kemalists aimed to also reduce the influence of religion from public life and placed
religious institutions under the control of the state. Instead of attempting to eliminate
religious influences, the state instead sought to give itself more control over religious
influences. These efforts began in 1922 with the abolishment of the Sultanate and
Caliphate, which the Kemalists saw as a lingering attachment to the Ottoman
285
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Empire. The elimination of Islamic courts followed in 1924. The government then
abolished the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, replacing it with
Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Müdürlüğü) and the DirectorateGeneral for Pious Foundations (Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü).291 The state tasked these
Directorates with the “interpretation and execution of an enlightened version of the
Islamic religion.”292
In addition to eliminating and replacing religious institutions the state enacted
measures to remove religious symbols from the public sphere. As recommended in
the garbcılar’s Westernization plan, the state closed down all shrines (türbes) and
dervishes (tekkes). Hospitals and social centers operated by religious organizations
moved under the administration of the state. The prohibition of the Ottoman fez and
the adoption of the European calendar, Italian penal code, Swiss civil code and Latin
alphabet all affected religion’s place in the Turks’ identity. Though symbolic and tied
mostly to Westernization efforts, the adoption of these Western cultural and social
elements also impacted the role of religion in Turkish society.
Turkish national identity, and by extension Kemalism, attempted to fill the void Islam
once occupied. In 1945 the Turkish Language Association even began defining
religion as: “A strongly held idea or ideal. Kemalism is the religion of the Turk.”293 In
many ways Kemalism became a political religion, which Mateescu explains as:
…profoundly revolutionary—it arises in times of political collapse to build a new establishment
on the ruins of a former one. It is also poised for an attack on the traditional religion aiming at
either appropriating its domain or simply eliminating it from the public realm…A political
religion revolves around the image of a charismatic leader whose name and image become
associated with the deification of the state as defined by the revolutionary political
establishment.294

Indeed, Mateescu’s description of political religion can be directly applied to the
example of Kemalism. The Kemalists capitalized on the religious void, which they
intentionally exacerbated, hoping to fill it with Turkish national identity. Through a
strategic combination of rapid, radical reforms the Kemalists promoted their Six
Arrows, and particularly Turkish nationalism, at the expense of religion, and at times
even as a religion. According to the Kemalists, Turkish nationalism was not only an
integral part to a Turk’s identity, but it was something Turks should whole heartedly
believe in.

Conclusion
The ideologies and policies of the Young Turks and the Kemalists certainly overlap;
this thesis does not attempt to debate that statement. Instead, this thesis seeks to
highlight the areas of discontinuity between the two movements and show that there
is not a direct line between them. While both movements carried out similar policies,
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their motivations for doing so differed. The extent to which they carried out these
policies also differed. Moreover, if one were to trace the roots of Kemalist ideology
and policies back to the Young Turk movement, this would point to a strong influence
from the movement’s garbcılar faction versus its central leadership.
Gökalp, often referenced in current scholarship as the ‘father of Turkish nationalism’,
certainly influenced Kemalist ideology. Yet there are also areas where he diverged
from Kemalist thought, such as the adoption of Western civilization and the inclusion
of religion in Turkish identity. In these areas, we can see a stronger influence from
the ideas of Cevdet and the garbcılar, whose beliefs arguably formed the basis for
the radical measures put forth during the Kemalist era.
The Young Turk movement’s preservationist mindset directly contrasted with the
creationist mindset of the Kemalist nationalist movement, which strived to construct a
new homeland out of the ruins of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Had the CUP
leadership remained in power and successfully overcome the challenges of World
War I, it is unclear how they would have chosen to continue running the Empire. It
can be assumed from the ideological shifts occurring at that time that the CUP would
have continued efforts to forcefully and violently homogenize the remaining Ottoman
population and enforce a shared identity, but the extent and speed at which they
would have done this remains unknown. Since the CUP’s central leadership did not
agree with the stances of the garbcılar, which influenced the radical reforms of the
Kemalists, it is unlikely that its future measures would have mirrored those of the
Kemalists.
In conclusion, the links between the two movements are extremely complex and
cannot be summarized as merely a continuation from one to the other. As this thesis
has attempted to highlight, there were links to different groups within the Young Turk
movement as well as discontinuities between the ideologies and policies of each
movement. Kemalist ideology can certainly be traced back to many ideas that gained
prominence in the Young Turk era, but it is necessary to dig deeper to show the links
between specific ideas, individuals and time periods. This thesis hopes to shed light
on the need for further scholarship on these discontinuities and the reasons behind
them.
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Appendix
Turkish Translations
Türkçe

English

Ahali Fırkası
Altı Ok
Amasya Genelgesi
Atatürkçülük
Aydınlar
Cumhuriyetçilik

People’s Party
Six Arrows (of Kemalism)
Amasya Circular
Kemalism
Intellectuals
Republicanism

Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası
Devletçilik
Devlet-i Osmaniye
Devrimcilik
Diyanet Işleri Müdürlüğü
Dokuz Umde

Republican People’s Party
Statism/Etatism
Ottoman State
Revolutionism/Reformism
Directorate for Religious Affairs
Nine Principles
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Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü
Fedakâran-ı Millet Cemiyeti
Garbcılar
Garbcılık
Halkçilik
Halk Evleri
Halk Fırkası
Halk Odaları
Hars
Hakimiyet-i Osmaniye
Heyet-i Müttefika-i Osmaniye
Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası
İskan Kanunu
İslahat-ı Esasiye-i Osmaniye Fırkası
İslamcılık
İttihad-ı Muhammedi Fırkası
Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti
İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti
Irk
Jön Türkler
Katib-i Umumi
Kemalizm
Köy Enstitüleri
Kurtuluş Savaşı
Laiklik
Medeni
Medeniyet
Merkez-i Umumi
Millet
Milli
Milliyetçilik
Mutedil Hürriyetperveran Fırkası
Milli Mücadele
Misak-ı Milli
Muasir
Muasirlaşmak
Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası
Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası
Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu
Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası
Osmanlıca
Öz Türkler
Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası

Directorate-General for Pious
Foundations
National Unionist Federation
Westernists
Westernization
Populism
People’s Houses
People’s Party
People’s Rooms
Culture
Ottoman Rule
Ottoman Committee of Alliance
Freedom and Accord Party (Liberal
Union, Liberal Entente)
Resettlement Law
Ottoman Fundamental Reform Party
Islamism
Mohammadin Union
Society of Ottoman Union
Committee of Union and Progress
(CUP)
Race
Young Turks
General Secretary
Kemalism
Village Institutes
Liberation War
Secularism
Civilized
Civilization
Central Committee
Nation (also: group organized by
religion)
National
Nationalism
Moderate Liberal Party
National Struggle
National Pact
Modern
Modernity, Civilization
Ottoman Liberal Union
Ottoman Democratic Party
Ottoman Freedom Society
Ottoman Empire
Ottoman Socialist Party
Ottoman (language)
True Turks
Free Republican Party
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Tehcir Kanunu
Terakki
Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası
Teşkilat-i Mahsusa
Türkiye
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
Türk Derneği
Türk Ocağı
Türk Yurdu
Türklük
Türkçulük
Vatan

Relocation Law
Progress
Progressive Republican Party
Special Organization
Turkey
Turkish Grand National Assembly
Turkish Association
Turkish Hearth
Turkish Homeland
Turkishness
Turkism
Country
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